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This thesis is a study of English-language media opinion in relation to Canada‘s 
involvement in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.  Using The News Record, The Globe 
and the Manitoba Free Press, this thesis will examine how the English Canadian press 
presented the Paris Peace Conference to Canadians from November 1918 to its signing in 
June 1918.  Historians have traditionally presented the Peace Conference as a turning 
point in Canadian history that accelerated Canada‘s maturity from a colony to a fully-
fledged nation.  This paper will argue that Canadians‘ understanding of the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 was far more complex than the orthodox interpretation would suggest.  
While Canadian newspapers were concerned with Canada‘s status, they devoted far more 
attention to other matters.  Canadian newspapers spent time discussing reparations, the 
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On October 26, 1918, Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of the Dominion of 
Canada, received word from David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain, to 
make haste to Europe for meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet.  At these meetings the 
Imperial War Cabinet would discuss imperial policy for the Peace Conference which 
would follow the end of hostilities.
1
  Borden quickly made plans to head to the Conference 
with a team of cabinet ministers and experts and departed on November 7 for London.  
His purpose was to take part in the preliminary discussions respecting the terms of peace 
and to represent Canada in connection with the peace conference.
2
  When the armistice 
was signed on November 11, Borden was on the Atlantic, arriving in London on 
November 18.  Canada‘s odyssey at the Paris Peace Conference then began.  Beginning 
with three months of planning in Britain and France followed by a conference lasting 
approximately six months, Canada was introduced to the world of international 
diplomacy.  This experience would be chronicled by Canadian newspapers with great 
interest. 
This thesis examines how the English-Canadian press presented the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919.  Beginning with the journalist J.W. Dafoe who was part of Borden‘s 
Canadian delegation, Canadian historians have generally portrayed this conference as an 
important turning point for Canada.  George P. deT Glazebrook wrote his account of 
Canada‘s position at the Peace Conference in 1942; C.P. Stacey was less detached, and 
was generally critical of the overall conference, but, like Glazebrook, he too conceded that 
the Conference was an important part of Canada‘s constitutional evolution.  Margaret 
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Macmillan examined what Canada learned from the Peace Conference.  Historians 
generally mentioned the Peace Conference as part of Canada‘s evolution as a Dominion 
and as a turning point in the Dominion-Empire relationship.
3
  These historians generally 
examine the Conference from the view of the politicians and diplomats in Paris and focus 
on the motivations of Canada‘s Prime Minister, Robert Borden and the debates he had 
with other delegates for increased Dominion status and influence.  
Canadian newspapers examined many ideas and proposals for the Peace 
Conference.  They often agreed, but not always.  Often the newspapers‘ editors became 
emotional: they called for the head of the Kaiser, or lambasted Italy for its selfish ways; 
they pleaded with the United States to end its isolation; and the Japanese earned sympathy 
for their request of racial equality. There were contradictions in their articles and editorials 
at times.  The press wanted to see that Canada received adequate representation at the 
Conference which befitted the role it played in the war.  They wanted a treaty that 
properly punished Germany and that demanded for Canada appropriate restitution.  The 
press also wanted to see a strong League of Nations emerge which would ensure world 
peace and end what they termed the old diplomacy of secret treaties and alliances. 
As the meetings in Paris continued into the spring of 1919, other pressing domestic 
issues brought the press to debate whether Borden should stay in Paris and represent the 
country or come home.  Thus, as much as historians have made a great deal of Canada‘s 
signature on the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919, readers of the English-Canadian press 
at the time saw it within a very different context.  While the Peace Conference did feature 
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prominently in Canadian newspapers, it was occasionally pushed aside by domestic issues 
such as the Winnipeg General Strike.   
The historiography (Glazebrook, Stacey, Macmillan) suggests a consensus that 
ultimately began with a journalist who worked for the government in 1919, and which was 
later articulated by a diplomat writing in the midst of another world war.  Though C.P. 
Stacey is more critical of the overall achievements of Paris, he too argues that Canada 
accrued important benefits from its time in Paris.  All are agreed that Paris represented an 
important step for Canada in the long term development of Canada‘s international 
standing.  But few of them dwell on the complex and often contradictory ways in which 
Canadian reporters both anticipated and then understood Paris. 
G. P. deT Glazebrook, C. P. Stacey and Margaret Macmillan have provided the 
most detailed assessments of Canada‘s place at the Peace Conference.  Many general 
histories of Canada such as Robert Laird Borden: A Biography by Robert Craig Brown, 
Borden: His Life and World by John English, Canada, 1896-1921: a Nation Transformed 
by Robert Craig Brown, Ordeal by Fire: Canada, 1910-1945 by Ralph Allen, and 
Canada: 1900-1945 by Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, mention the 
Peace Conference at the end of the World War I chapter, or at the beginning of the inter-
war chapter.  When mentioning the Peace Conference they focus on the importance of 
Canada‘s representation and the uphill battle to achieve it.  It is also important to look at 
how these sources have written specifically about Canadian public opinion and the press 
in relation to the Peace Conference. 
The first of Glazebrook‘s two books on Canada and the Paris Peace Conference 
was written during the Second World War while he was a diplomat with the Department 
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of External Affairs.  In those circumstances, it is not surprising that he would argue that 
Canada‘s role in Paris marked ―. . .an important step in the march of Canada toward an 
increasing activity in world affairs and—closely bound up with that—toward greater 
autonomy in the field of foreign affairs.‖
4
  Perhaps Glazebrook was thinking of his own 
time when he argued that  
One of the effects of the war on Canada was to make her more ready to take a 
direct place in the world of states.  Its military and economic effort in the war had 
given her confidence, a sense of accomplishment, and added impetus to a slowly-




Stacey also saw the Peace Conference as an important moment in the history of 
Canada‘s external relations.  In his book Canada and the Age of Conflict, Stacey portrays 
the Peace Conference as a step on the way from Empire to Commonwealth that was made 
possible by Canada‘s efforts in the war.  Macmillan wrote that Canada went to Paris 
because its citizens ―cared deeply about a lasting peace settlement after the worst war the 
modern world had known, a war in which Canadians had fought and died.‖
6
   
 Historians also agree that the Canada‘s role in the war found the country a place at 
the Peace Conference.  Canada‘s delegates reminded other nations, particularly Great 
Britain, of the large contribution of troops and supplies that Canada made to the war 
effort.
7
  Stacey wrote that in 1918 that ―there was no doubt that the British Dominions 
would have to be consulted about the terms of peace.‖  Stacey points out that the British 
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had accepted this principle in 1915.
8
  Lloyd George recognized this in his memoirs of the 
Peace Conference.  He wrote of a huge Canadian contribution and that Canadian troops 
were responsible for some of the most brilliant victories of the war.
9
  Dafoe wrote that it 
was Canada‘s participation in the war that truly allowed it to establish itself as a distinct 
nation.
10
  The Dominions succeeded in making their claim that they had earned their 
nationhood and the right for representation at the Peace Conference due to their significant 
contribution to the war.
11
  It was this large wartime contribution that historians argue 
allowed Canada to push successfully for stronger representation for Canada and the other 
Dominions at the Paris Peace Conference. 
 Historians have also spent much time analysing Canada‘s objectives going into the 
Peace Conference.  Glazebrook argued that Canada went into the conference looking for 
more equality of status with other countries and to establish new relationships with Britain 
and other foreign powers.
12
  Glazebrook wrote that Canada had a special interest in the 
League of Nations:  
From every point of view this came close to Canada.  It involved her equality of 
status on international bodies, proposed commitments by the members that called 
for close study, and was intended to include the United Kingdom and the United 
States, the two great powers by whose policies Canada was always most affected.
13
   
 
A review of the newspaper coverage at the time confirms these generalities, but the 
realities are more complex, and are addressed in the second chapter. In the giddy mood of 
the post-war, Canadians had a number of lofty (and not so lofty) aims. 
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Glazebrook also acknowledged that Canada did pursue other interests while at the 
Conference.  Canada was interested in racial equality, the proposed labour organization 
and the convention on air navigation.
14
  Ultimately, Canada‘s foreign policy at this stage 
was rooted in what was best for Canada.  Canada was interested in the labour organization 
because, according to Glazebrook, Canada was ―a country of increasing industrial 
importance where the views of organized labour made up an important element in public 
opinion.‖
15
  Canada had recognized the impact that international relations would have on 
its own domestic affairs and had decided that it had better be involved in the formation of 
these treaties. 
Stacey agreed with Glazebrook that ―from what has already been said it emerges 
clearly that what Canada and the other Dominions were primarily interested in at Paris 
was their own status, and they pursued this object with determination and considerable 
success.‖
16
  Stacey also wrote that Canada was mostly interested in affairs relating to 
Britain and the US.
17
  Canada went in with a goal of changing its status within the British 
Empire.
18
  Again Canada was interested in affairs that most affected Canadians.  
Macmillan argues that the Canadian representatives quickly learned that Canada‘s 
interests did not always match those of the Empire.
19
  Macmillan emphasized what 
Canada had learned at the Conference, rather than its goals.  The Canadian government 
was more concerned with issues that might affect Canada at the Peace Conference, rather 
than those that dealt with Germany.   
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Canadian historians have also carefully studied the role of Borden at the 
Conference.  Dafoe wrote that Borden carried with him the conviction that Canada 
deserved equal representation, and he told British leaders that Canada would not attend the 
Peace Conference without direct representation.
20
  Most Canadian accounts emphasized 
the strong line taken by Borden.  Borden came across as a man who was prepared to do 
anything to ensure Canada‘s rightful place at the conference.  Stacey saw Borden as the 
man who pushed the hardest for Dominion representation and organized the Dominions to 
present a united front.
21
  Stacey also wrote that it was Borden who pushed Canada-US 
relations as one of the focal points of Canada‘s efforts at the Conference.
22
  Glazebrook 
described Borden as a broker between factions within the British Empire and as a fighter 
for Dominion rights.
23
  Borden was respected enough within the Empire that he was able 
to bring differing sides together, yet he was also able to push for Canada‘s interests.  
Acting as the ring leader for the other Dominions, he brought their cause to the forefront. 
 The historian L.F. Fitzhardinge disputed this point, suggesting that the Australian 
Prime Minister, W. M. Hughes took the lead for Dominion equality.
24
  Borden was more 
inclined to follow the lead of Britain and was protective of his position as the senior 
Dominion Prime Minister.
25
  Fitzhardinge portrayed Borden as a man more interested in 
maintaining his high position with Lloyd George than with pushing hard for Dominion 
equality at the Peace Conference.  However, this still suggests that Borden was still very 
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much interested in ensuring Canada had an important role by jealously guarding his 
position. 
There is some, but not much discussion of Canadian press coverage of the 
Conference.  M. E. Nichols examined the problem of Canadians receiving relevant news 
through the news agencies and the problems Canadian newspapers had with the Peace 
Conference.  Nichols wrote that the Associated Press was the only source of international 
news, and it was not adequate for American and Canadian readers at the same time.
26
  The 
example Nichols used was the British elections where AP reports were few, while 
Canadian interest was high and American interest low.
27
  The British elections along with 
the Armistice and the Peace Conference in only three months revealed the Canadian Press‘ 
meager overseas capabilities, in which they were unable to even send a correspondent to 
the Peace Conference.
28
  There were many challenges confronting Canadian newspapers 
in their efforts to provide coverage of the Peace Conference. 
Glazebrook wrote briefly about public opinion in Canada at the Paris Peace 
Conference.  He wrote that an examination of Canadian newspapers revealed that the 
press underplayed the importance of Canadian representation at the Peace Conference and 
failed to take advantage of the regular cables offered by Dafoe.
29
  Perhaps Canadian 
newspaper editors were loath to be dictated to by someone they might see as a government 
press officer.  When Canadian newspapers examined the treaties they often focused on the 
effects they would have on Canada.
30
  Canadian newspapers still had much to learn about 
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covering international events.  Canadian public opinion did not necessarily coincide with 
the opinion of Canada‘s decision makers overseas. 
Did Canada‘s representation actually contribute anything to the Conference?  
Glazebrook wrote that ―generally speaking, it is fair to say that the Canadian delegation 
was active and far sighted in its pursuit of Canadian interests, and gave a good impression 
in its general work in the Conference.‖
31
  Stacey was less enthusiastic, pointing out that 
Canada made some contribution to the proceedings, but had little influence on the 
settlement with Germany.
32
  For Stacey, Canada helped ―through the commissions and 
committees, exemplified by Borden‘s labours on the boundaries of Greece, which helped 
to produce a settlement that has stood to the present day. More of it was made through the 
British Empire delegation.‖
33
  For both historians, Canada contributed in areas that would 
affect their own interest and also in rather minor areas.   
There was also a consensus that Canada certainly benefited from its relatively 
minor contribution to the Peace Conference.  Soothed by receiving equal representation, 
Canada was able to have a greater influence in the negotiations.
34
  Stacey called the whole 
conference a ―gigantic sham‖, but he allowed that if no one else profited from the system 
of equal representation, the Dominions certainly did.
35
  Macmillan wrote that ―although 
imperial unity was maintained, the fault lines had become apparent in Paris. Dominions 
had gained the right to accept or withhold their assent to international agreements.‖
36
  By 
Canada and the other Dominions gaining representation at the Conference, the British 
Empire was becoming a commonwealth. 
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 The benefits Canadians accrued were almost immediate, write historians.  Their 
representatives were able to sign the treaty as representatives from the Dominion of 
Canada under the British Empire signature.
37
  It was not quite what Canada would have 
wanted, but Canada was signing an international document as an important member of the 
British Empire.  Government leaders saw this as a clear sign of Canada‘s increasing 
sovereignty.  Macmillan was less positive.  For her the meaning of the signatures was as 
ambiguous as Canada‘s status at the Peace Conference.
38
  By signing the treaty, Canada 
was able to gain representation in the newly formed League of Nations and the 
International Labour Organization with a status that was equal to that of any other 
nation.
39
  With membership in these international organizations, Canada was able to take 
part in international negotiations and agreements independent of Britain.  They would now 
have a much stronger means of articulating Canada‘s position on issues rather than it 
coming through a British Empire delegate.   
 Glazebrook argued that the Peace Conference would have a lasting impact on 
Canada‘s foreign affairs because Canadians politicians would gain experience at 
conducting diplomacy.  Glazebrook wrote that:  
Official Canada had gained experience in the arts of war and diplomacy, and the 
public was to exhibit a marked degree of interest in world affairs – an interest that 
had existed only in a small degree before the war.  Here, if properly encouraged 
and channelled, was one of the most important assets that a country with world 
interests could have.  An informed and critical public opinion would in turn 
stimulate parliament to a close study of the government‘s foreign policy, and 
ensure that a degree and direction of Canada‘s activity in the foreign field was in 




                                                     
37
 Glazebrook, Canada at the Paris Peace Conference, 111. 
38
 Macmillan, ―Canada and the Peace Settlements,‖ Canada and the First World War, 393. 
39
 Robert Laird Borden, Canada in the Commonwealth, from Conflict to Co-operation, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1929), 103. 
40
 Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, 22-23. 
11 
 
For Glazebrook, the Conference had not only succeeded in moving Canada towards 
increased sovereignty, it would also create an interest in foreign affairs in the country.  
The Canadian press had covered the Peace Conference closely, and Canadians had ample 
opportunity to read about the Conference.  Now, hopefully the Canadian people would 
also join the country‘s politicians in seeking more autonomy from Britain.  Glazebrook 
was very confident that the Peace Conference had wide-reaching effects within Canada.    
We can look back and see that historians and those who took part in these events 
have a rather positive view of Canada‘s experience.  As both a journalist and a participant, 
Dafoe believed that the Peace Conference was a catalytic event which broke up the 
traditional empire and replaced it with a group of nations working towards common 
goals.
41
  Dafoe said that the Peace Conference was the moment in history when Canada 
fully claimed the powers that justified its participation in these international events.
42
  
Later commentators echoed Dafoe‘s tone. Glazebrook said that the decisions reached near 
the end of the war and at the Peace Conference were a strong starting point in the case for 
Dominion autonomy.
43
  Stacey called the negotiations an important precedent because 
they set the stage for consultation with the Dominion on British policy.
44
   
 Historians and those who took part in the events largely agreed on what happened, 
why it happened, and why it was helpful.  They agreed that the outbreak of World War I 
presented an opportunity for Canada to take more control of its affairs.  In the narrative 
presented by these historians it was thanks to Borden, other Dominion leaders and Lloyd 
George, that the Dominions were given equal status at the Paris Peace Conference and 
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were given an opportunity to affect the outcome.  As a consequence of Canada achieving 
this status, it was able to play a larger role in international affairs, especially through the 
new League of Nations and was able to develop policy from Ottawa rather than London.  
However, this consensus does little to tell us what Canadians read about these seminal 
events in their history.  Therefore, to gain some kind of understanding of what Canadians 
were thinking about the Peace Conference, we must examine their main source of 
knowledge about the Peace Conference, the Canadian press. 
In the days before television and radio, the primary source of information was the 
newspaper.  While not giving a completely truthful representation of public opinion, 
newspapers do offer insight into what the Canadian public was reading.  According to one 
analyst of newspapers, there are two ways of analysing public opinion outside of an 
election. One is by public opinion polls, and the other is by an analysis of newspaper 
opinion.
45
  At this time, there was little to no public polling done, therefore in order to 
decipher Canadian public opinion at the time an analysis of Canadian newspapers is 
required.  For the purposes of this analysis, three newspapers were chosen to compare and 
analyse: The Globe, the Manitoba Free Press, and The News Record from Kitchener, 
Ontario.  The newspapers examined were between November 1918 when the armistice 
was signed and July 1919 when the Treaty of Versailles was finally signed. 
 Governments also recognized the importance of newspapers as creators of political 
opinion.  To that end, Sir Robert Borden decided to include representatives of the press 
with his official delegation.  In November 1918, Cabinet Minister Newton Rowell 
outlined in a letter to Borden the importance of good publicity of Canada‘s actions 
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overseas.  Rowell wrote that ―the lack of publicity last summer created a serious condition 
of public sentiment in Canada and led to very grave and widespread dissatisfaction with 
the Government.‖
46
  Rowell did not want to see voters dissatisfied with Borden while he 
was at the Peace Conference.  He also wrote:  
It appears to me that publicity will be doubly important during the next few 
months.  With the probable closing down of munitions plants and men being 
thrown out of employment and with the reaction from the strain of work, there is 
likely to be considerable unrest.  We can only expect to carry public opinion if we 
keep it well advised of what is being done by the Ministers overseas and of the 




Rowell was blessed with excellent foresight.  Canadian newspapers did begin to write 
unfavourably of the Prime Minister being in Paris during the winter of 1919 and wondered 
when he would come home.  However, John W. Dafoe, the editor of the Manitoba Free 
Press, and official press correspondent, defended the Prime Minister outlining the 
excellent work that the Prime Minister was accomplishing.  Rowell also managed to 
foresee the labour difficulties that would arise, such as the Winnipeg General Strike.  
Unfortunately, Dafoe‘s glowing reports of the Canadian delegation were not enough to 
distract the workers from going on strike and the Manitoba Free Press having to shut 
down for a few days due to lack of paper. 
The Manitoba Free Press was chosen by the author because its editor J. W. Dafoe 
was a representative of the Canadian Department of Public Information at the conference, 
and was sending reports back to Canada, and in particular to the Manitoba Free Press.  
The newspaper philosophically supported the Liberals before the war, but not 
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  During the war, Dafoe and the newspaper changed their support to Borden 
and the Unionists.  The Manitoba Free Press also had an international outlook, thanks to 
its editor Dafoe and the diversity of Winnipeg.
49
  The newspaper definitely had a close 
relationship with the governing Unionists.  The owner of the newspaper was Sir Clifford 
Sifton, brother of Arthur Sifton, a Cabinet Minister who accompanied Borden to Paris.
50
  
However, even Clifford Sifton thought that Dafoe supported the Unionists too much, 
saying that no government had ever had such a strong supporter within a newspaper.
51
  
Also, the man who recommended Dafoe to Borden was Liberal-Unionist Cabinet member 
Newton Rowell.
52
  The government knew that Dafoe shared the same goals, and that it 
would be able to get friendly stories sent back to Canada.  Since the Boer War, Dafoe had 
aligned the Manitoba Free Press along a strong nationalist position.
53
  
The Globe was chosen because it was one of the larger newspapers in Canada at 
the time.  The President-Publisher of The Globe at the time was William Gladstone 
Jaffray, a conservative and religious man.
54
  Jaffray refused to allow The Globe to carry 
―advertisements for cigarettes, girdles, whisky and cheap clothing.‖  He also gave 
sympathetic coverage to his fellow religionists and unsympathetic coverage to those he 
considered atheists.
55
  The newspaper‘s religious leanings would be evident throughout its 
coverage of the Peace Conference.  The Canadian journalism historian W. H. Kesterton 
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noted that at the time The Globe had editorials noted for their sermon-like cadence and 
tone, particularly when moved by strong national emotion.
56
  At the time, The Globe was 
in the process of changing from a newspaper that supported the Liberals to one that 
supported the Conservatives.
57
   
Finally, The News Record was chosen because it was a paper from an area that had 
many German immigrants.  The owner of the newspaper at the time of the Conference was 
W. J. Motz who had purchased the paper in 1918.  Motz was a member of the local 
German community and had been involved in German language newspapers for many 
years.  Motz was also a proponent of German culture.
58
  The war years had not been easy 
for Motz.  As a result of a summary his German newspaper, the Berliner Journal, printed 
on the first year of the war, he was accused of sedition by a competing newspaper.
59
  Motz 
and The News Record presented an alternative narrative of the Peace Conference to those 
presented by other papers in English Canada. 
In this study both the news pages and editorials will be examined.  The American 
sociologist and former journalist, Robert E. Park wrote that ―in a democracy where 
everyone reads, and particularly in a period of rapid change and revolution when political 
opinion and political power are in the making, it is news rather than the editorial that 
makes opinion.‖
60
  Both editorials and news have an effect on public opinion.  It was 
Park‘s argument that there can be no public opinion, unless the public knows what is 
happening.  Public opinion is formed through discussion and debate and this can only 
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happen in a free society, where people are informed.
61
 Editorials are often simply the 
product of an editor, an editorial committee, or a publisher.  But in their tone and 
argument, they often reflected a range of opinion that is seldom considered in wider 
studies of the post-war period.    
This thesis is organized into three chapters.  The first will consider Canada‘s 
ambiguous constitutional position before and during the First World War. Then it will 
introduce briefly the Canadian delegation and the conference itself.  The second chapter 
will consider how the Canadian press anticipated the conference‘s opening in January 
1919.  Showing at once a high-minded morality and internationalism, a vitriolic hatred of 
the Germans, as well as a certain amount of self-interest, Canadian journalists and 
editorialists considered in great detail what the Paris Peace Conference should achieve.  
Above all, the press insisted that Canada‘s sacrifice had earned it the ‗right‘ to participate 
in the deliberations that, it was hoped, would bring a permanent peace.  In the final 
chapter, the period from the beginning of the Conference until the Treaty of Versailles was 
signed, will be examined.  This period of time demonstrated a return to realism in the 
Canadian press.  An idealistic view of the League of Nations persisted, however the 
actions of certain countries at the Conference brought about a realization that not 
everything was perfect.  Canadian newspapers were shocked to find out that many 
countries would continue conducting diplomacy in the old way. 
This paper will argue that Canadians‘ understanding of the Paris Peace Conference 
of 1919 was far more complex than the orthodox interpretation would suggest.  In the 
months between the end of the war and the opening of the Paris Peace Conference, the 
English-Canadian newspapers combined a lofty, religious optimism about the need for a 





just and permanent peace with vitriolic arguments to hang the Kaiser and to gain for 
Canada compensation from Germany. All the newspapers agreed that Canada deserved a 
status at the conference that confirmed its participation in the war; indeed, this became 
recognized by some as a Canadian right. 
As the Peace Conference began, both the tone and substance of Canadian reporting 
changed as optimism gave way to a more realistic view of the Conference and Canada‘s 
role in it.  Canadians continued to have close coverage of the proceedings, which certainly 
did not match the almost naive optimism that anticipated the conference.  Eager claims for 
reparations gave way to the harsh dilemma of considering how Germany was to pay its 
enemies without destroying the fragile German economy.  Calls to abolish secret treaties 
gave way against the persistence of the old diplomacy.  Concerns about American 
leadership only heightened as Woodrow Wilson began to fight with his Congressional 
opponents over what many considered the most important part of the conference, the 
League of Nations.  And calls for racial equality did not receive a very receptive hearing 
in Canadian newspapers.  Nor were these reports of Paris read in a vacuum.  As the 
proceedings wore on, Canadian attention drew away from Paris. Demands grew for the 
prime minister to return home to address more demanding domestic issues.  By the time of 
the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919, Robert Borden was home.  Even as 
Parliament debated whether to ratify the Treaty to which it Canadians had offered a 







 Canada’s Constitutional Status and the Peace Conference 
 
This chapter first explores Canada‘s constitutional status prior to and during World 
War I.  It then examines the conference itself, with particular attention to the Canadian 
delegation.  
Canada entered the Peace Conference with an uncertain constitutional status 
relative to Great Britain and the British Empire.  Borden wrote after the war that while 
―the Germans may have grasped other conditions, it is clear that they thoroughly failed to 
comprehend the constitutional relations between the self-governing nations.‖
62
  This 
failure to understand the British Empire led them to underestimate the men and resources 
the Empire would be able to bring to bear. 
Canada‘s constitutional status was far from clear because it had been evolving 
since before Confederation.  In the years just after Confederation, Canada‘s politicians 
were engaged by Britain to negotiate treaties with the United States.  In 1871 an elected 
Canadian official, the Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, was on the British 
delegation that helped negotiate the Treaty of Washington, which settled political and 
economic issues between the Empire and the US.
63
  The next step after Dominion 
participation in treaty making was the ability for Canada to opt out of treaties made by 
Britain.  In 1877 this became so, when British commercial treaties were no longer made 
applicable to the colonies without their assent, and from 1882 on, all treaties required a 
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special clause if it applied to the colonies.
64
  In the last years of the 19
th
 century, principles 
for negotiations between colonies and foreign powers were laid down.  The principles 
were strict: the Imperial Government had to take part in every step of the treaty 
negotiations, and could in the end block any treaty from being ratified.
65
  However, when 
formulating its foreign policy, the Imperial Government continued to follow a policy of 
non-consultation with the Dominions.
66
  
The Prime Minister from 1896 to 1911 was Sir Wilfrid Laurier who rejected any 
Imperial consultation on foreign policy with the Dominions, since this would require the 
Dominions to take on a greater responsibility.
67
  Laurier did not believe that the country 
was ready to take responsibility for what might come from a more independent foreign 
policy.  Despite these beliefs, it was Laurier who created the Department of External 
Affairs in 1909.  However, Laurier had to be pushed into it, and at the time, the 
Department was not considered a proper foreign office, but rather machinery to make the 
current way of doing business more efficient.
68
 
When Sir Robert Borden became Prime Minister in 1911, he insisted that Canada 
be consulted on foreign policy matters.  Borden began to contemplate having a minister of 
his Cabinet stationed in London who would attend meetings of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence when matters of Dominion concern were raised.  A major change occurred in 
Dominion-Imperial relations in 1912 when, at the Radiotelegraphic Conference, the 
Dominions were represented by delegates with full authority from the King, and sat as a 
separate delegation from the British.  This was followed the next year at the Conference 
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on Safety of Life at Sea with delegates from the Dominions and Britain again sitting 
separately.
69
  In the view of some, these precedents allowed the Dominions some measure 
of international status and helped prepare the Dominions for more international 
responsibility. 
The First World War brought about major change in Dominion-Imperial relations 
and the pace of evolution towards Dominions sovereignty began to rapidly increase.
70
  
When Great Britain went to war in August of 1914, its declaration committed the whole 
Empire to the war.
71
 While Canada had no choice in the matter, it did have the choice as to 
how it would support Britain in the war.  Canada offered its aid to Britain and sought 
advice on what was required for the war effort.  In return, Britain made no demands of 
Canada.
72
  Britain was careful not to trample on the Dominions‘ autonomy over their 
internal affairs.
73
  Britain made the big decisions and directed the war, while the 
Dominions were able to choose how best to help and to direct the efforts in their own 
countries.  This autonomy was also extended overseas to the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force.  While military operations fell under the direction of British Generals, the Canadian 
forces were administered after 1916 by the Overseas Ministry that was responsible to the 
Canadian Government and Parliament.
74
  The Overseas Ministry was responsible for the 
personnel, property and expenditures of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in Britain.
75
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The Dominions were not invited into any kind of partnership to help direct the war 
effort during the first half of the war.  In 1915, however, the British government agreed to 
consult the Canadian Prime Minister in all aspects when the time came for discussing the 
terms of peace.
76
 When it came time to negotiate peace terms at the end of the war, Britain 
intended to consult its Dominions.  However, due to the considerable size of men and aid 
contributed by the Dominions, their lack of say in the running of the war began to be a 
problem.
77
  When David Lloyd George became Prime Minister of Britain in December 
1916 he decided this would change.  On March 2, 1917, the Imperial War Cabinet met for 
the first time and included the British War Cabinet plus the Prime Ministers of the self-
governing Dominions.
78
  Lloyd George formed the Imperial War Cabinet so that the 
Dominions would feel more intimately involved in the war planning, and therefore 
hopefully be willing to offer more support.
79
  The Dominions would be keen to accept the 
idea because it would mean a larger say for them in Imperial policy. 
The Imperial War Cabinet had no constitutional authority and existed only as long 
as its members willed its existence.  The Cabinet or any single member could not issue 
orders to the others nor could it bind its members to agreements.
80
  It was essentially a 
meeting of representatives of equal governments to discuss the war and recommend 
policies to their respective governments.  It was an excellent place for discussion and 
allowed Dominion Ministers to present their views to the British War Cabinet.
81
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The Imperial War Conference meetings in 1917 and 1918 brought the prospect of 
change to Canada‘s constitutional status.  The most important contribution of these 
Conferences was the passing of Resolution IX on April 16, 1917 which dealt with future 
constitutional relations.
82
  This resolution has been attributed to Borden with help from the 
South African representative, General Jan Smuts.
83
 The resolution read:  
The Imperial War Conference are of opinion that the readjustment of the 
constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and 
intricate a subject to be dealt with during the War, and that it should form the 
subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after 
the cessation of hostilities. 
 They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their view that any 
such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-
government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full 
recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial 
Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should 
recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign 
policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for 
continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and 





The resolution called for future constitutional talks after the war, and then outlined the 
basis of what this future conference would discuss.  Borden wrote that: 
This resolution establishes the basis of future co-operation; it gives clear 
recognition to equality of nationhood between the Dominions and the Mother 
Country; and it marks one of the final stages in the evolution of constitutional 




In Canada, the resolution appealed to both Nationalists and Imperialists.  While the 
resolution describes the Dominions as ―nations‖ it also called for combined efforts.
 86
  The 
resolution also was not definitive about Dominion sovereignty and left it open to future 
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  However, this resolution would encourage Canada to look for more 
autonomy and a greater say in Imperial affairs, which would culminate in Canadian 
representation at the Paris Peace Conference.  It was not yet inevitable that Canada would 
get a seat at the Conference, but it was fairly certain that Britain would support its 
Dominions in any effort they made for representation. 
The Constitutional status of Canada during the First World War is difficult to 
determine. Canada was recognized in international law but no one was exactly sure about 
the definition of this recognition.
88
  It was clearly not a sovereign nation since it could not 
declare war or make peace, yet it was more than a colony.
89
  Canada‘s status had changed 
since Confederation yet nothing new had been added to its constitution.  How then to 
interpret Canada‘s status? According to P. J. Noel Baker, the full significance can be 
understood only through comparison of the text of the constitution with the historical 
development.
90
  Also, the constitution must be judged along with ―new practices that by 
general consent modify or change in their application the existing rules of the statutory 
law of the Constitution.‖
91
  Canada‘s status during the war, and immediately after was 
confusing.  However, the status was changing due to new practices developing and 
promises of future changes, such as Resolution IX.  But such ambiguity meant that the 
Canadian delegation that Borden gathered for his trip to Paris was most uncertain of its 
status, let alone its ability to contribute meaningfully to the conference. 
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The Paris Peace Conference began on January 18, 1919.  However, delegates had 
been meeting and planning since the war ended the previous November.  Sir Robert 
Borden and the rest of the Canadian delegation had been summoned to England to begin 
discussions before the armistice had even been signed on 11 November 1918.  The 
Canadians became part of a massive diplomatic gathering. While Canada brought a rather 
modest delegation of 15 members, countries like Serbia brought 100 delegates.  British 
Prime Minister Lloyd George brought 200 assistants and 200 clerks.
92
  In total, 32 
countries attended that would all be represented at the Plenary Conferences.  However, 
only six of these conferences were held before the Treaty of Versailles was signed in late 
June 1919.
93
  The major countries: the United States of America, the British Empire, 
France, Italy and Japan would meet regularly and make the real decisions.  They would 
form the Council of Five, or the Council of Ten, known as the Supreme Council, when the 
foreign ministers joined their leaders.  There was also the smaller Council of Four which 
excluded Japan.  This grouping could be made even smaller by excluding Italy, to form 
The Big Three.  The large countries were joined by many smaller nations that had 
participated in the war.  The British Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
India were granted representation as well, although they did not find this out until January 
1919.  Germany and its allies were not invited.  Neither was Russia. 
The American delegation was led by President Woodrow Wilson.  He was the first 
American president to travel to Europe while in office, and his political opponents accused 
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him of breaking the constitution as a result.
94
  As a president who campaigned against war 
in 1916, Wilson was very cautious about bringing America into the war in 1917, and he 
never became used to being a war President.
95
  Wilson, eager to end the war and to push 
the other Allies along, agreed publicly with the German plea that the Fourteen Points be 
the basis of the armistice.
96
  Wilson had introduced the fourteen basic principles in a 
speech to the US Congress on January 8, 1918 that were intended to lay the ground work 
for the peace that would follow.
97
  The Fourteen Points dealt with issues from the territory 
of Germany and its allies and the territory they had conquered, to a call for ―A general 
association of nations . . . formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording 
mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small 
states alike.‖ Wilson‘s plan for a league of nations would allow for all countries to discuss 
the world‘s problems, and self-determination for all the downtrodden of Europe.
98
 
Other national leaders were less sure of the American principles.  The French 
delegation was led by the Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau.  He was the oldest 
national leader of the Council of Five, having seen the Prussians march into Paris in 1870.  
He had no illusions, having seen mankind at its worst over his many years.
99
  Clemenceau 
had led France during the war with a single-minded urgency.
100
  The French prime 
minister would take a leading role in the Peace Conference with the same urgency he had 
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The British Empire delegation arrived under the leadership of the freshly re-elected 
British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George.  Lloyd George would be the voice of 
moderation between the idealism of Wilson and the pragmatism of Clemenceau.  While 
the British public back home wanted to see Germany suffer to the utmost, he knew that 
Germany would be unable to pay, and that forcing it could lead to economic disaster.
102
  It 
was also Lloyd George who had persuaded the other big powers to allow the Dominions 
representation outside of the British Empire at the Conference.
103
 
It is important to mention the contribution of other members of the Empire for they 
would often prove to be a thorn in the side of the Conference and of the mother country.  
The Australian Prime Minister, William ‗Billy‘ Hughes, was by no means any kind of a 
moderate. He was used to the rough politics of Australia, was often deaf to any argument 
he did not like, and often made up Australian policy on his own.
104
  Hughes was disliked 
by his fellow delegates. Wilson was enraged by Hughes and Clemenceau called him a 
―savage.‖
105
  Some have argued, however, that much of the increase in Dominion standing 
was attributable to work done by Hughes.
106
  Whether or not this was true, there was no 
doubt that he worked alongside the other Dominion leaders to push for greater Dominion 
representation. 
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The Canadian delegation consisted of only 15 delegates.
107
 It included the Prime 
Minister, Sir Robert Borden, and three of his cabinet ministers; Sir George Foster, Charles 
J. Doherty and Arthur L. Sifton.  The Canadian legal experts included Loring C. Christie 
from the Department of External Affairs and Major Olivar Asselin from the Department of 
Justice.  The military experts were Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, Commander of 
the Canadian Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver M. Biggar. The Financial, Economic 
and Labour representatives were Lloyd Harris, chairman of the Canadian Mission at 
London, R. T. Younge, secretary of the Canadian Mission, F. P. Jones, vice-president of 
the War Trade Board, P. M. Draper, secretary of the Canadian Trades and Labour 
Congress and W. A. Warne, from the Department of Trade and Commerce.  Two 




The leader of the Canadian delegation to Paris had been Prime Minister since 
1911, winning a majority in part by opposing reciprocity with the United States.
109
  From 
the start of his term as Prime Minister, Borden was in favour of Canada having a voice in 
imperial foreign policy.
110
  Unlike his predecessor Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Borden was 
prepared for Canada to take on more responsibility in return for an increased role.  He was 
not opposed to pressure tactics to get what he wanted from the British Government.  Upset 
about the lack of consultation over the Battle of Passchendaele in 1917 and the perceived 
incompetence in the British High Command, Borden threatened to stop the flow of 
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Canadian troops if Canada was not consulted more.
111
  He continued his efforts for 
increased Canadian consultation to the Peace Conference, where he demanded separate 
representation for Canada.
112
  The Peace Conference was a big event for Borden, as he had 
spent most of his political career looking to see Canada take on greater responsibility with 
its foreign affairs. 
The most experienced member of the Canadian delegation was Sir George Foster, 
the Minister of Trade and Commerce.  Foster had been a member of the Conservative 
Party for many years, until the 1917 election when he joined Borden‘s Unionist party.  
Foster had served as a cabinet minister in Conservative governments since Sir John A. 
Macdonald was Prime Minister.  Prior to the conference, Foster had diplomatic experience 
serving as a British delegate at the allied economic conference in 1916.  He had strong 
opinions.  Foster was disdainful of the idea of self-determination. In his diary, he called it 
the ―Wilson legend,‖ and referred to the supporters of the idea as being on a ―pilgrimage.‖  
He felt, for example, that self-determination ―if logically carried out, would erect a chaos 
of incapable and impossible communities, and spell ruin and disorder and possible 
anarchy.‖
113
  He also saw the Conference as ―unique in history, and the deliberations and 
conclusions of which will influence the future of humanity as none other.‖
114
  Foster wrote 
in his diary on January 25, 1919, concerned that the Conference might get sidetracked, 
that ―the terms of peace are the requirement of first importance, and on these the 
Conference must converge all its force and effort.‖
115
  He served as one of the two 
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members representing the British Empire on the Supreme Economic Council.
116
  Foster 
remained at the conference until June 12, 1919, when he was forced to return home due to 
his wife‘s poor health.
117
  Foster was a politician who truly believed in the importance of 
the Conference and a need for a lasting peace.  But he had reservations about some of the 
conference‘s more lofty objectives. 
The second member of Borden‘s Cabinet on the Canadian delegation was Charles 
Joseph Doherty, the Minister of Justice and the Unionist member from St. Anne, Québec.  
Doherty had been raised in Quebec, spoke French fluently and was a former lawyer and 
Quebec Superior Court judge before turning to politics.
118
  He had been Minister of 
Justice since before the war, first as a Conservative, and then as a Unionist.  Like his 
fellow cabinet minister Arthur Sifton, Doherty‘s knowledge of foreign affairs was not as 
great as other members of the cabinet, and it was unclear why the two were chosen for the 
delegation.   
The final cabinet member on the delegation was Arthur L. Sifton.  This former 
Liberal Premier and Chief Justice of Alberta was the Minister of Customs and Inland 
Revenue in Borden‘s Unionist cabinet.  He had resigned as Premier of Alberta in 1917 to 
join Borden‘s Union Government,
119
  and was the only former Liberal politician to join 
Borden in Paris. Arthur‘s brother, Clifford Sifton, was a former Liberal politician in the 
Laurier government and the owner of the Manitoba Free Press.
120
  While enthusiastic 
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There were other cabinet ministers that Borden could have brought who might 
have had more experience and knowledge in international relations.  Perhaps Borden‘s 
goal in leaving some of his more experienced cabinet ministers in Ottawa was to leave a 
strong and knowledgeable team at home.
122
  Also, he chose members from both sides of 
the governing unionist coalition.
123
  However, he did not always have the highest opinion 
of some of those he chose to bring with him. Borden thought Foster was inconsistent, and 
did not take his ideas seriously.
124
  It was a delegation that Borden controlled.  Borden 
attended most of the meetings of the British Empire delegation, and did not always tell his 
fellow Canadians what had transpired.
125
  It was not clear what criteria Borden used to 
select members from his Cabinet for the delegation, however, he came away with a 
delegation that was chosen more for political reasons than for experience or knowledge. 
Loring C. Christie from the Department of External Affairs was a close advisor to 
Borden.  He had joined the Department in 1913 and became its first legal advisor.
126
  He 
attended the Imperial Conferences, gatherings of British Empire leaders, with Borden, and 
helped him draft Resolution IX in 1917 which promised to deal with constitutional 
relations after the war.
127
  Christie was a strong proponent of increased Canadian 
autonomy from the Empire.  He saw Canada as more than a colony and believed it had a 
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  For Borden and Christie, the primary purpose of Canada‘s 
involvement in the war had been to prove that Canada could pull its weight and contribute 
internationally. The goal at the Imperial War Cabinet and Conferences as well as the 
Peace Conference was to gain recognition for Canada at international meetings and in 
international organizations.
129
  Christie would be an important advisor and ally to Borden 
at the Peace Conference. 
Accompanying Doherty to the conference was Major Olivar Asselin.  Prior to the 
war, Asselin had been a journalist and budding politician.  He had been editor of several 
newspapers and had worked at Le Devoir with its nationalist founder, Henri Bourassa.
130
  
Asselin enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force in 1915 and was asked by the 
Minister of Militia, Sam Hughes, to raise the 163
rd
 Battalion as a French-Canadian 
infantry battalion.
131
  To Asselin‘s dismay, the battalion was disbanded on arrival in 




  Asselin was a Francophile, 
who feared above all else German rearmament after the war.
133
  At the conference Doherty 
was sitting on a committee dealing with European minorities.  He had asked Asselin to 
join the Canadian delegation as his advisor on minority issues, due to Asselin‘s French-
Canadian background.
134
   
Serving as military advisor to the delegation was Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur 
Currie, the commander of the Canadian Corps.  The other members of the delegation 
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consulted him about the military terms of the treaty.
135
  He also provided tours of the 
battlefields to various members of the Canadian delegation such as Borden and Dafoe.
136
  
Currie was in favour of harsh terms for the Germans. He had seen results of the war first 
hand and wanted a lasting peace and he believed that German military power had to 
end.
137
  Currie also provided much of the information that Borden used to press for 
increased Canadian autonomy.  Through his leadership of the Canadian Corps and its 
excellent war record, Currie gave Borden the military victories that he could use to 
demand Canadian representation at the Peace Conference.
138
 
John Wesley Dafoe was editor of the Manitoba Free Press and served as the 
English representative of the Department of Public Information.  Dafoe has been described 
as ―powerful and persuasive‖ and as ―one of the most influential Canadian journalists in 
history.‖
139
  Dafoe had started out as a Liberal, but saw himself in the centre of the 
political spectrum, and had no difficulty switching allegiances.
140
  Dafoe strongly 
supported Borden during the war, especially during the conscription crisis.
141
  Dafoe was 
invited to the Conference to prepare publicity so that the public was kept informed of the 
actions of Canada‘s representatives in Paris.
142
  Dafoe strongly influenced what the 
English Canadian press wrote about the Conference, especially through the paper he 
edited for Arthur Sifton‘s brother, Clifford, the Manitoba Free Press. 
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From the outset, the conference that would end the First World War was marked 
by confusion and disagreement between the participants.  Paris had not been the only 
choice for the location of the conference. Geneva, Lausanne, Brussels and The Hague had 
all been considered, and discarded for various reasons.
143
  The French Prime Minister was 
determined to have it in Paris as consolation for France‘s sufferings during the war.
144
  
The British were most opposed to this idea.  They feared it would be impossible to have a 
neutral conference in the capital city of one of the countries that had suffered most during 
the war.
 145
  This was an example of some of the many disagreements Allied countries had 
before the Conference had even begun. 
The choice of city was to have an impact on the press as well.  The press writing in 
French in France turned against the Americans and Wilson quite bitterly.
146
  Throughout 
the Conference the French media accused President Wilson of theocracy, of being pro-
German and of being too idealistic.  The press constantly printed jokes ridiculing him.
147
  
It was not only the French press which was causing discord.  According to the British 
diplomat Harold Nicolson, who attended the conference and wrote a book about it, ―the 
ineptitude of the newspapers published in Paris in the English language has seldom been 
surpassed.‖
148
   
Location also affected how Canadians received news from the Peace Conference.  
In 1919, 16 of the 20 transatlantic cables were under American control.  The Americans 
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also controlled the cabled news service which reached North America.
149
  Inevitably, 
much of the news arriving in Canada had an American bias and the opinions expressed 
were often unfriendly to Britain.  At the time American newspapers were not particularly 
interested in hearing both sides of British controversies, looking for unity in British 
opinion or describing conditions in Britain accurately.  According to contemporary 
commentator, J. Castell Hopkins, the American media appeared more interested in 
relaying unfriendly stories, rather than the most important ones.
150
  In 1916, Hopkins 
complained that the American press portrayed the Irish Rebellion of 1916 as more 
important than the British victory at the Battle of Jutland.
151
  Since it was cheaper to get 
their news from these news sources, Canadian newspapers sometimes promulgated these 
biases.
152
  Perhaps for these reasons did Borden decide to bring along his own press 
representatives. Borden was sensitive to public opinion and wanted to make sure that the 
work the Canadian delegation was doing in Paris received proper publicity.
153
  The 
Canadian press representatives from both English and French Canada helped ensure that 
Canadian readers, both English and French speaking, gained a Canadian perspective.  
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November 1918 to January 1919 – Preparation for the Peace Conference 
 
The media coverage from the end of the war until the beginning of the conference 
in late January of 1919 was notable for its euphoric sense.  Using religious language that 
compared the post-war to a religious rebirth and the dawning of a new era, Canadian 
newspapers outlined what they thought should be accomplished at the Peace Conference.  
Echoing the Wilsonian hope that an international organization would eliminate the old 
system of secret treaties and bring diplomacy into the open, the Canadian press 
emphasized a need for a just peace, an end to the balance of power and the end of 
conscription.  But this idealism was contrasted with a considerable anger towards 
Germany.  The press paid close attention to calls for Germany to pay reparations and to 
put the Kaiser on trial.  Measures were also required to prevent Germany from returning to 
autocracy.  To adopt this new way of doing international affairs, a League of Nations had 
to be created to ensure that all the changes the Peace Conference had brought about would 
be fully protected.  Of course, the newspapers were not in agreement about all the issues 
all the time.  They had differences in how some things should be accomplished, or in the 
degree to which the action should be carried out.  All of the reporting agreed, however, 
that Canada deserved representation at the Peace Conference that was proportionate to the 
role it played in the war. 
Coming out of the war offered a definite sense of optimism in Canadian 
newspapers.  The Globe noted on the day after the armistice that ―tyranny has been 
dethroned, the world breathes once more the air of liberty, and humanity looks on the 
36 
 
future again with eyes of hope and gladness.‖
154
  The News Record acknowledged that 
there was ―more optimists to-day than there were a year ago,‖ and that ―out of the 
maelstrom of war a brighter and better day will dawn for the world.‖
155
  Both newspapers 
were very optimistic, which was a common trait for Canadian newspapers following the 
armistice. 
This optimism was tied to a view of Canada undergoing a rebirth.  The perception 
in the press was that the country had cast aside its small status and pre-war isolation and 
was ready to argue strongly that it had earned rights.  For the Free Press, the country had 
―earned the right to hold our heads high among the nations of the earth,‖ and the war ―had 
revealed Canada‘s power in the world.‖
156
  The News Record noted that ―on the 
battlefields of France and Flanders this Dominion has been born again.‖  As a result ―the 
trial increased its self reliance and broadened its vision.‖
157
  Already, Canada was being 
portrayed as a new country.  A new country that had more experience, was more reliant, 
and therefore could be expected to have a greater role in the world. 
Such a growing sense of self-confidence caused The News Record to ask the 
question: ―Would it be wise or foolish to draw into our shells and await developments?‖  
Should Canada return to the way it did things before the war?  The newspaper was 
adamant,  
Seeing the tremendously big things which our people have performed in these war 
years, it would be stultifying to sit down and wait for what time and tide may 
bring.  Indeed they can if they will overcome both new circumstances and new 
conditions.
158
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It was the duty of Canadians to continue on the path they had started during the war. 
Historians writing later talked about this sense of rebirth.  In 1942, Glazebrook 
said that Canadians were aware that ―physical and moral participation in the war had 
wakened a new sense of nationalism, and at the same time given them a stake and a 
rightful place in world affairs.‖
159
  Stacey stated that ―there is little doubt about its effect 
upon Canadian nationality.  The tremendous effort and the tragic losses of 1914-18 did not 
wholly transform Canada and the Canadians, but they certainly left them rather different 
from what they had been before.‖
160
  Both the press and historians talk of this 
transformation that was tied to Canada‘s performance during the war. 
Considering Canada‘s place in the world inevitably led the Canadian press to 
consider the evolution of the British Empire.  The term ‗empire‘ seemed to be going out of 
use and the press used various names to describe the empire, from ―the world-wide 
Britannic Commonwealth,‖ to a ―league of nations‖ and as well a ―confederation of free 
nations.‖
161
  The various Dominions within the Empire were evolving towards a more 
egalitarian position with Britain.  The Manitoba Free Press saw the Dominions moving 
away from ―Imperial centralization‖ into a looser union.
162
  Australia too, saw a change in 
the make-up of the Empire.  Prime Minister Hughes of Australia saw Dominion 
involvement in the Peace Conference as ―the dawn of a new era,‖ where the Dominions 
were tied ―only by sentiment to the motherland.‖
163
  Hughes likely did not reflect 
Canadian opinion, but such talk anticipated a changing relationship within the British 
Empire.   
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Amidst the lofty optimism of the post war, the Canadian press had high 
expectations for the Peace Conference.  On November 4, 1918, the Manitoba Free Press 
announced that it was ―Essential Peace be Made Permanent.‖
164
  Former British Prime 
Minister H. H. Asquith was quoted that ―we must attain something better than any of the 
conventional peaces of history.‖
165
  The News Record acknowledged that this would be the 
―World‘s Greatest Peace Congress.‖
166
  There was pressure demanding that this peace 
conference solve many of the world‘s problems once and for all.  Also, this conference 
would be unique in that not only was the conference to settle the war, but it was to ensure 
that nothing similar could ever happen again. 
Canadian newspapers also understood that peace would be difficult to achieve.  In 
November 1918, both The News Record and the Free Press quoted Borden as saying that 
―the problems ahead were perhaps even more difficult than those faced during the 
fighting, but Canadians would confront them with equal courage, resolution and 
confidence.‖
167
  Canadian newspapers saw the war not as the end of Canada‘s 
participation, but as a transition to another role. 
Delays in the opening of the Conference only helped heighten expectations. In 
November, the Free Press speculated that the Conference would begin after the British 
elections on December 17 that saw David Lloyd George re-elected as British Prime 
Minister.
168
  Soon, however, the papers reported that the Peace Conference may have to be 
delayed until the political situation in Europe had settled.
169
  A few days later The News 
Record was reporting that it was probable that the Peace Conference could not begin 
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before early January and that the peace treaty would be signed by the end of February.
170
  
In January, Dafoe wrote in the Free Press that the Conference would probably not begin 
until February and that ―so great is the complexity of the innumerable questions to be 
dealt with that it is apparent that a final and definite settlement of them all would involve 
at least a session of six months.‖
171
  While the Canadian press understood that peace 
would be difficult to achieve, they initially displayed a naivety of how soon it could start 
and how long it would take.  In other matters they were equally naïve. 
Beginning in November 1918 and continuing until the beginning of the 
Conference in late January, newspaper reports debated if and how Canada would have 
representation.  This was because the Canadian representatives had to convince their 
British compatriots at the Imperial War Cabinet.  On arriving in Paris, they also had to 
convince the other great Allied powers.  The Globe noted that not all countries recognized 
Canada as a ―co-belligerent‖ in the war, but would only recognize Canada through Great 
Britain at the peace table.
172
  The Free Press reported that President Wilson rejected the 
idea of the British Empire having so many delegates.
173
  Other Allied countries feared that 
if the British Dominions were to all have representation, then the British would have a 
considerable voting bloc that could sway events.  It was not obvious that Canada would 
get representation at the Peace Conference. 
Some of the newspapers expressed sadness that Canada might not be represented.  
However, they were also combative in demanding the right of representation for Canada.  
The Globe lamented as late as December that ―there will be no direct representation for 
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  The Free Press quoted the Unionist cabinet minister Newton Rowell who 
announced that  
It is essential in Canada‘s interests that she should be represented at the peace 
conference and that her voice be heard in the solution of those great problems.  
The people of Canada will not be content with anything else.
175
 
   
Canada‘s government and public no longer thought that the British could fully represent 
Canada‘s interests on the world stage. 
In December when The Globe reported that Canada might have representation, it 
said that Canada should have no reason to be unhappy ―with her place and her share of the 
proceedings.‖
176
  On receiving word that Canada would receive two representatives at the 
Peace Conference, The News Record reported with satisfaction that this was good news 
that showed Canada‘s status as a key member of the Allied powers.
177
  All the newspapers 
believed Canada was highly deserving of representation, and believed this important status 
was deserved from the country‘s key contribution to the war effort.  The Globe argued that 
if representation was measured by its contribution to the war, then Canada would take 
precedence over many of the other countries who had been given representation at the 
conference.
178
  The Globe believed that Canada deserved representation at the Peace 
Conference because of Canada‘s contribution to the allied war effort.  The Globe repeated 
this position on several occasions in future issues.  The paper wrote that: ―when the record 
is completed it will probably be established that with a smaller proportionate number of 
men in the field and of casualties than Great Britain or the other overseas Dominions, 
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Canada has pulled full weight in the boat.‖
179
  The Manitoba Free Press took a similar 
line, announcing that the British Dominions, who played such a large role in the war, 
would probably receive delegates in addition to the British Empire delegation.
180
  The 
newspaper argued that ―the right of the Dominions, as direct participators in the military 
efforts of the Allies, to a voice in the settlement of the terms of peace could have been 
justified on that basis alone.‖
181
  Referring to Canada‘s representation at the Conference as 
a ―right‖ was a common theme in the Manitoba Free Press.  In another article it said ―this 
is a matter in which we have a right to be concerned ... we have the right by virtue of our 
sacrifices.‖
182
  The language used suggested that not only had Canada earned 
representation at the Peace Conference but now the country had a right to it.  It was not an 
issue that Canadian newspapers would give up on. 
The Canadian delegation in Europe held more realistic expectations, but 
sentiments back home made the Canadians in Paris more determined to gain separate 
representation. On December 4, 1918, White cabled Borden that the Cabinet was ―even 
more strongly of opinion than when you left that Canada should be represented.‖  White 
wrote that: 
council is of opinion that in view of war efforts of Dominions other nations 
entitled to representation at Conference should recognize unique character of 
British Commonwealth composed of group of free nations under one sovereign 
and that provision should be made for special representation of these nations at 
Conference even though it may be necessary that in any final decisions reached 
they should speak with one voice; that is this is not possible then you should form 
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The Canadian Government was of the opinion that because of Canada‘s war efforts, the 
country deserved representation at the conference, and if that was not possible, then 
Borden should be a member of the British Commonwealth delegation.  Borden agreed 
with the members of his Cabinet.  At a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on December 
31, 1918, Borden said that if Canada were not to receive representation at the Peace 
Conference, then ―the result upon public opinion in Canada would be such as he did not 
care to suggest, or even contemplate.‖
184
  The issue of Canada‘s representation would not 
be settled until days before the Peace Conference began on January 20, 1919.  The issue 
would not be resolved as simply as portrayed by historians. 
Beyond the issue of Canadian representation were the wider issues to be addressed 
by the Peace Conference.  The Globe took a particular interest in the fate of the German 
Kaiser, Wilhelm II.  Canadian newspapers held the Kaiser directly responsible for many of 
the horrors of the war.  The Globe called the Kaiser a ―menace‖ and maintained that he 
would be a problem for the Allies.
185
  The Globe‘s editors wrote that the Allies could not 
risk leaving the Kaiser free and that his fate ―will probably be one of the questions for the 
Peace Conference.‖
186
  The News Record called the Kaiser ―the arch plotter,‖ and said that 
it was his ―overweening lust for power, [which] plunged the world into this long period of 
slaughter.‖
187
  The Globe claimed he should be tried for ―the murder of men, women, and 
children done to death on land and sea by German soldiers, acting under his orders in 
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defiance of the laws of war and of civilization.‖
188
  The newspapers also repeated wartime 
charges and accused German soldiers of committing grievous crimes against civilians.   
On December 9, 1918, The Globe announced that ―Britain Consults Dominions as 
to Fate of Kaiser.‖
189
  The newspaper‘s editors were excited at a prospect that could offer 
a larger role for Canada.  However, it was not clear that Canada really had any say.  The 
British had proposed a possible trial for the Kaiser at the Imperial War Cabinet meeting of 
November 22, 1918 and later in the month it unanimously adopted the statement that ―the 
ex-Kaiser should be held personally responsible for his crimes against international 
law.‖
190
  Robert Borden, who had been away, recorded in his diary that he was dismayed 
that the motion was taken in his absence.
191
  Despite the strength of editorial opinion at 
home, Borden opposed a trial and preferred to see some resolution from the Peace 
Conference regarding the fate of the Kaiser.
192
   
The Kaiser never did go on trial, but spent the rest of his days in exile in the 
Netherlands.  Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles charged him with ―a supreme offence 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.‖
193
  However, the Dutch refused 
to hand him over, and the Allies, not wishing to be seen as bullies, decided not to press the 
issue.
194
  He died in 1941, just missing the German invasion of the Soviet Union.
195
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Given the Canadian popular view of the Kaiser, it was not surprising that the 
Canadian press wanted only minimal German participation in the conference.  On 
December 21, 1918, The Globe quoted a French government source to the effect that the 
Germans would have no role in negotiations, would not have an opportunity to have their 
views heard, and would simply have to accept or reject the Conference‘s terms.
196
  When 
the Peace Conference convened for its first official session, The News Record reported 
that the Central Powers were not represented and that once the treaty was completed, the 
German government would be asked to sign it.
197
  The paper suggested that the ―peace 
conference will be largely a mere formality as Germany will presumably accept the 
terms,‖ mostly because it would be ―not quite a ‗sign there‘ proposition but almost.‖
198
   
The Manitoba Free Press took a similar view.  It too expected and hoped for 
minimal German participation in the Peace Conference.  In a dispatch on December 23, 
1918 the editor of the Free Press, Dafoe, outlined the ―amazing campaign of propaganda‖ 
which the Germans had undertaken to ease the penalties which would be imposed on 
them.
199
  Dafoe also noted that this campaign of propaganda was designed to ―spread 
distrust among the Allies and to foster disagreement.  But the impenitence and the 
hypocrisy of this is shocking to the morals of the Allied peoples.‖
200
  Not only did the 
press expect the Germans to have no representation, but they also saw the Germans as 
unworthy of representation.  An editorial in the Free Press noted that German 
representation would probably be discussed at a preliminary conference of the Allies, but 
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that it was expected the Germans would do no more than ―register their consent to the 
decisions of the conference.‖
201
   
Reparations were also on the minds of Canada‘s representatives in Europe.  Cables 
between Borden and his cabinet in Ottawa tried to decide on what war claims Canada 
should make.  Sir Thomas White, the Acting Prime Minister and the Finance Minister, 
cabled Borden in December 1918 that Canada‘s total war expenditure up to March 1919 
was expected to be $1,290,000,000.  White was aggressive, writing that:  
In addition to direct claim in respect of our war expenditure you will not lose sight 
of claims for indirect damage covering interruption to trade and dislocation of our 
business generally.  We should, I think, also claim punitive indemnity in respect of 
our casualties.  Damages for the Halifax disaster amounting to say thirty million 
dollars would appear to me to be a fair claim also.
202
   
 
Canadian newspapers maintained a lively debate on reparations, for their editors 
felt strongly that Germany should be forced to pay reparations to Canada.  The Globe led 
the way in explaining why Canada should receive reparations just as much as the main 
Allied powers.  While countries like France and Belgium had suffered damage to their 
territory and many of their important industries, Canada had suffered as well.  The Globe 
declared it was reasonable that if Germany was forced to repay to rebuild Northern France 
and Belgium, then ―she should put up the money for the reconstruction of the mercantile 
marine of Britain and the overseas Dominions, or give up her own shipping in 
compensation.‖
203
  Canadian newspapers saw the Peace Conference not only as a way to 
solve the world‘s problems, but also as a way to receive compensation from the Central 
Powers.  Perhaps Canadian newspapers were a bit naive to think that Canada would factor 
into the discussion for reparations.  The Free Press was also adamant that Germany be 
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made to pay.  In December 1918, the Free Press wrote that a way had to be found to 
―exact from Germany the costs which she ought morally to pay and which the Allies have 
the clearest legal right to demand.‖
204
  The following month the Free Press stated that 
―Germany cannot be allowed to escape scot-free from her liability to pay a large part at 
least of the costs of the war into which it plunged the major part of the world.‖
205
  
Employing words like ―morally,‖ ―legal‖ and ―liability,‖ the press conveyed reparations as 
an issue of law and morality, not one of vengeance.  Having started The Great War, 
Germany had a moral and legal duty to repair the damage it had caused.  There was also 
precedent for reparations, for Germany had forced France to pay reparations after the 
Franco-Prussian war of 1871 and more recently forced Bolshevist Russia to pay 
reparations in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918.
206
 
The Globe was at its most vitriolic in an article detailing many of the alleged 
German war crimes.  In an editorial published on December 12, 1918, entitled ―Make the 
Beasts Pay,‖ the newspaper wrote of the atrocities committed against Allied soldiers by 
the Germans.  The editorial explained that  
Many of our Canadian lads and tens of thousands of British soldiers have been 
done to death by murderous jailors in obscure prison camps, mines, and factories 
where there were no witnesses of the outrages, nor any pitying soul to lighten the 
discomforts of the dying hours of the victims or speak words of consolation and 
farewell.
207
   
 
Therefore,  
The beasts who did these things must be punished as individuals, and the nation 
that permitted them to be done—that stopped its ears to the cry of helpless 
captives—should be required to pay to the uttermost farthing for the maintenance 
in comfort of the families of men murdered in camps and prisons, and for the 
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The Globe editorial invoked a far more personal image of German cruelty to insist on a 
series of war crimes trials as well as compensation for their captives.  
The News Record took a softer approach.  The newspaper called for Germany‘s 
punishment through reparations, but acknowledged that the Allies should not be too tough 
in the application of the reparations.  The News Record wrote that ―to mete out justice it 
will by no means imply a weak peace.  Instead it signifies retributive justice which, while 
providing for reparation, will not crush the enemy.‖
209
  It was important that Germany and 
the other Central Powers be made to pay for the damage they had done, however, it would 
not do to crush the German state.  It was in the best interest of the Allies for democracy to 
take hold in Germany but that would not happen if Germany was ruined while trying to 
pay the reparations. 
In The News Record, there was some confusion as to what Canada would ask for in 
compensation.  It initially reported that Borden would ask that one billion dollars of the 
reparations received by France and Belgium would be spent in Canada.
210
  However, two 
days later, the paper corrected this, reporting that Sir Thomas White, the acting Prime 
Minister, had denied Canada would forgo any indemnity as long as one billion dollars was 
spent in Canada.
211
  The newspapers, as well as the government, appeared uncertain as to 
what Canada would ask for in reparations. 
One of the more interesting ideas reported by the Canadian press was a proposal to 
give Canada the Danish colony of Greenland.  The Globe first reported the idea in an 
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editorial on January 8, 1919.  It was proposed that if Denmark was to receive the northern 
German province of Schleswig, which it lost in the 1860s to Germany, the Danes would 
be willing to turn Greenland over to Canada.
212
  The News Record outlined a brief history 
and economic overview of the island, noting that it had potentially enormous mineral 
wealth.
213
  However, The Globe was sceptical, noting that it would be an expensive 
investment and that it be properly investigated before any decision was taken.
214
  The 
News Record on the other hand said that Canada should not be picky, although 
Newfoundland or the Bermudas would be more attractive to most Canadians.
215
   Now 
these ideas seem quite far-fetched and it does not appear that they were even on the minds 
of Canada‘s representatives in Europe.  According to one Canadian historian, these ideas 
were met with ―public indifference and probably, private derision.‖
216
  Also, neither 
newspaper presented any kind of evidence for the proposal.  The Globe did not report the 
source of this idea and The News Record‘s source was a newspaper correspondent for a 
British newspaper.  The idea was soon forgotten. 
The Canadian delegation in Paris sought to balance the sense that Germany be 
punished with the fear that German economic disaster could lead to Bolshevism.
217
  In a 
meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, Sir George Foster declared that ―we should demand 
that the whole costs of the war should be paid by the enemy Powers; but it may possibly 
be that the enemy Powers are not able to pay that.‖
218
  Canadian delegates tended towards 
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the softer approach to reparations pushed by the Manitoba Free Press and The News 
Record.   
While it was important to receive restitution from Germany, it was also important 
that the Peace Conference prevent Germany from returning to an autocracy.  The Globe 
argued that one of the major goals of the Peace Conference should be to ―render 
impossible the restoration of military autocracy.‖
219
  The paper feared that the 
Hohenzollerns could return at the head of a royalist party and retake control of the 
country.
220
  Nine days after the Armistice, The News Record stated that there were three 
main goals of the war: ―to destroy militarism; to establish throughout the world the 
principle of government of the people, by the people and for the people; and to end war as 
a means of settling international quarrels.‖
221
  The newspapers saw the pre-war German 
government as opposing these principles which helped to bring about the Great War. 
Therefore, in order for those goals to be successful and maintained into the future, 
Germany must be kept from returning to an autocracy.   
One of the ways to defeat militarism, as proposed by The Globe, was to outlaw 
permanent conscription around the world.  The paper wrote that ―conscription has been 
sometimes the defense of free peoples against despotism, but in the hands of despotism it 
has been the greatest menace to the world‘s liberties.‖
222
  The ability of despots to call on 
millions of men to fill the ranks of their armies was a significant threat to the rest of the 
world.  The abolition of conscription was ―a very wonderful thing, which if it prevails in 
the Peace Conference, will lift from Europe a crushing moral and material weight, and 
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will more than any other act cut the blight of militarism.‖
223
  Again the newspapers were 
using morals as an argument.  The press very much saw the war as a struggle of good 
against evil, and the Peace Conference as an opportunity to impose Allied morality on the 
enemy states.  Despite the fact that many Allied countries, including Canada, had used 
conscription during the war, some Canadian newspapers editors argued forcefully that 
permanent conscription had to be abolished. 
Canadian newspapers also used the rhetoric of Wilson‘s Fourteen Points to argue 
against the balance of power in Europe prior to the war.  Canadian newspapers argued that 
it resulted in a continual arms race between the competing powers, while smaller countries 
had no choice but to follow the orders of the most powerful.  For The Globe, that 
―venerable bogey the ‗Balance of Power‘ will have no place‖ in the post-Great War era.
224
  
As well, ―the reign of Law in the domain of International politics must replace the rule of 
Force.‖
225
  Rather than the large countries making their own laws, The Globe wanted a 
higher authority that would replace the balance of power.  It was important that a new era 
truly emerge from the Peace Conference. 
The News Record agreed with these sentiments.  The balance of power as a form of 
international politics was outdated and ―a combination of the big powers having for its 
object the establishment of a military strength that would overbalance any other possible 
grouping would constitute a challenge to the rest of the world and result in a continual 
race in preparations for war.‖
226
  These apparently were the conditions that led to the 
Great War and were therefore no longer acceptable.  This new system would have the 
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advantage of allowing smaller nations to ―lodge a complaint against the greatest power 
and have it decided on its merits.‖
227
  Might would no longer mean right, as smaller 
nations would be able to have their complaints heard. 
The paper also saw that in this new system of international politics victorious 
nations would hold new responsibilities.  No longer could they plunder and capture the 
territory of those they defeated.   The News Record explained its vision in an editorial: 
Drenched with blood and steeped in misery, Europe is convinced that warfare is 
savagery and the costliest way of settling international disputes.  Further it has 
proved that civilization has advanced too far to permit again a recourse to it to 
further personal or national ambitions.  To make war practically impossible, it is 
seen that the great nations must concertedly labor to maintain peace. 
To succeed in preventing war in the future the balance-of-power expedient 
and the age-old rule of to the victor belongs the spoils will both have to be 
abandoned.  Right must supercede might in international relations. 
The most difficult thing for the victors to do will be to yield the territories 
they have conquered.  Not to do so would render impotent any league of nations.  
The worsted nations would only remember their losses and prepare for a day of 
revenge. 
The principal allied nation has in this respect taken its medicine, placing 
permanent peace as a greater desideratum than territorial expansion.
228
   
   
It was an extraordinary statement with lofty and perhaps naive notions.  The newspaper 
condemned the old ways and demanded that peace be put at the forefront of all 
international diplomacy from then on.  It also demonstrated some superiority, as though 
North America had already reached the conclusion that war was savagery.  No longer 
would revenge or recapturing territory be seen as acceptable reasons for war.  The most 
powerful nations in the world could no longer make the laws.  It was a very optimistic 
statement by the newspaper, that victors would give up conquered territory willingly and 
war could be made impossible.  Looking back it is easy to dismiss such notions.  
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However, the greatest war Canadians and the world had ever known had just ended; it 
would be hard to begrudge Canadian newspapers their optimism. 
The Manitoba Free Press agreed completely with the other two newspapers.  
Previous peace treaties had helped cause war as a result of ―the arbitrary manner in which 
the diplomats have been accustomed to dispose of territories and to mark out international 
boundaries.‖
229
  The old diplomacy no longer worked and much more care and openness 
was required in order for peace to be maintained.  The paper decided that the war could be 
repeated if there was a ―failure to set up the machinery by which guarantees against the 
repetition of the events of the past four years can alone be secured is to perpetuate the old 
anarchy in place of setting up the new world constitution.‖
230
  This prediction was 
strangely prescient of what would happen in 20 years.  If some ―machinery‖ was not set 
up in order to prevent previous mistakes being repeated, another war was entirely 
possible. 
Canadian newspapers also discussed the idea of a League of Nations with 
enthusiasm.  The idea of a world organization bringing together all countries of the world 
had been around for many years.  However, the war had prompted various reports and 
draft constitutions.
231
  A draft Covenant was presented to the Peace Conference for 
discussion on February 14, 1919.
232
  No Canadian diplomat or politician made a large 
contribution to its creation, but Canadians paid close attention to its development.
233
  
Canadian newspapers agreed that it was a very good idea and something that would usher 
the world into a new age of diplomacy.  The press supported an international league that 
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would end the old diplomacy that had failed at keeping the peace in the world.  No longer 
would diplomacy be conducted in secret and peace kept by the so-called ―balance of 
power.‖  Countries would be beholden to a higher authority that would arbitrate between 
the nations and solve problems.  Small countries could challenge bigger countries and 
have a chance to win their cases.  Countries would be forced to respect the decisions of 
this higher authority, for if they did not, all other countries in the League would be 
arranged against them. 
The Canadian press generally had high hopes for the proposed League of Nations.  
Reflecting perhaps the devotions of its publisher, The Globe employed a Christmas theme 
in December 1918: ―not since the Angel song echoed above the fields of Bethlehem 
nineteen centuries ago has the war-weary world had a greater opportunity of securing 
universal and enduring peace.‖
234
  The statement highlighted the happiness that the war 
was finally over, and the optimism that the League of Nations would achieve a lasting 
peace.  The News Record was optimistic as well, but did not use as colourful a metaphor.  
A League of Nations would help ―mankind be ushered into a new and better era,‖ and the 
very idea has ―gripped the minds of the peoples of all nations.‖
235
  According to Canadian 
newspapers, not only was Canada entering into a new era, but so was the whole world.  
Optimism in Canadian newspapers was not limited to the future of Canada. 
The Canadian press had a vision of the League of Nations as a kind of arbiter or 
world Supreme Court.  The Globe decided that a league, whose members ―pledged to the 
settlement of all disputes between its members by resort to International Courts of 
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Arbitration, must inevitably emerge from the Peace Conference.‖
236
  It was the only way 
for peace to be preserved if the League‘s members had a higher authority to mediate their 
disputes.  The key was that all nations who were part of the League would agree to respect 
the decisions of the international arbiter.
237
  If nations submitted themselves to the rulings 
of an arbiter, it would be possible to maintain peace.  It would be the last stop for all 
international disputes and its rulings would be binding.  Again, Canadian newspapers were 
writing of the importance of nations having legal rights under international law.  Before, 
these rights had to do with reparations, but now the press was fleshing out a vision where 
a permanent body would decide what would be legally required after disputes between 
nations. 
All three newspapers made reference to the question of how rulings would be 
enforced.  The Globe was the most specific; it stated that ―a League of Nations without an 
international police force would be as ridiculous as a judge without power to punish the 
offenders who appear before him.‖
238
  The Globe wanted a League of Nations that was 
strong enough to enforce peace so that it can stop any nation trying to make war.
239
  The 
newspaper emphasized strength and unity as the keys to enforcing League of Nations 
rulings.  It did not believe that countries would accept the League‘s rulings just because it 
said so.  It was strongly in favour of an international police force, although it never 
elaborated on the make-up of this force. 
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The Free Press published an article from the Quebec Chronicle which called for 
an international force strong enough to enforce any decrees from the League.
240
  Again the 
newspaper emphasized strength and unity; strength to enforce the decisions of the League 
and unity so that all countries would back the decisions of the League once they were 
made.  Yet again, there was no elaboration on the framework of this international force.  
Would it be an independent army controlled by the League or would it be made up of the 
armies of various League nations? 
The News Record never called for a permanent force to enforce the League‘s 
rulings.  Its editors suggested that any country that refused to respect the decision of the 
League should be considered the enemy of all other states in the League.  All League 
nations should ―join their national forces against any nation which makes war in breach of 
this agreement.‖
241
  Whenever a ruling was ignored, all the nations would bring their 
forces together and deal with the truant. 
The Free Press had an interesting idea concerning the unity of League countries 
and enforcement of League decisions.  In an editorial the paper celebrated the newfound 
unity of the British Empire and the United States.  It declared that ―Britain and America 
will form together the amalgam which will cement the League of Nations and provide it 
with permanence and authority.‖
242
  An alliance of these two nations offered the League 
the authority and ability to enforce its decisions.  The League would not last long if it did 
not have one of these nations as a member.  
Despite the wide press speculation, Canadian delegates preparing to convene in 
Paris spent little time considering the League of Nations.  The Imperial War Cabinet did 
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form a committee which looked into Dominion representation at the League of Nations.  
However, Canadian representatives were then concentrating on getting representation at 
the Peace Conference.  Later on the Canadian delegation was concerned about this issue.  
In a letter to Borden on January 22, 1919, the Justice Minister Charles Doherty wrote that 
the present draft of the League of Nations covenant was unacceptable as it did not provide 
strong enough representation for Canada.
243
  Borden was determined to see Canada have 
proper representation in the League of Nations. 
The idea of Canadian representation at the League of Nations was mentioned on 
the front pages.  The News Record and the Free Press reported in January that Canada and 
the other overseas Dominions had begun an effort to claim separate representation from 
Britain and to enter the League as any other nation.
244
  This was a process that had already 
been started by Dominion demands for separate representation at the Peace Conference.  
Both newspapers announced that this was another step in recognizing Canada‘s newfound 
sovereignty.  The News Record announced that ―this would mean formal recognition by 
Great Britain of the sovereignty so far as internal affairs are concerned, of Canada and the 
other Dominions.‖
245
  The Free Press looked beyond recognition by Great Britain to the 
whole world: ―its acceptance will be a formal acknowledgement by the world for the 
Dominions existing autonomously within the British Empire and their equality with other 
nations.‖
246
  Both newspapers were beginning to recognize that this Peace Conference 
meant more to Canada than just bringing peace to the world.  They noticed that Canada‘s 
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constitutional status was evolving.  No new laws, or constitutional amendments were 
being made, but they recognized Canada was not the same as it had been before. 
Censorship and the freedom of the press at the Peace Conference was also an issue 
for which Canadian newspapers offered a strong opinion.  The News Record was the 
strongest in favour of complete freedom of the press and no censorship.  It presented the 
view that correspondents at the Peace Conference were not representing their various 
newspaper or news organizations, but rather were representatives of the people of the 
world.  The newspaper termed correspondents at the Conference ―representation for the 
people themselves.‖
247
  It went on to write that ―there is so much depending upon the 
results of the allied peace conference,‖ that ―the question of admitting the press assumes 
unusual importance.‖
248
  For The News Record,  
The correspondents sent thither do not appear as representing a single newspaper 
or group of newspapers.  Theirs is a vastly more important mission.  It is jointly to 
represent the peoples of the associated countries; to keep them informed daily of 
demands advanced and solutions reached.
249
   
 
Finally, excluding correspondents ―will not only be debarring these from hearing the 
claims made and subsequent deliberations theron [sic] but schemes which would not bear 
the searchlight of public opinion may be advanced.‖
250
  The newspaper held that the press 
would be the one to keep the politicians honest.  The News Record wanted the press at the 
Peace Conference to ensure that at this conference of such importance everything was 
examined carefully.  This was a role for which the press was well suited.   
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The Manitoba Free Press no doubt reflected the position of Dafoe in Paris and had 
a different opinion on the matter. While it did not believe in complete censorship, it was 
not in favour of complete freedom of the press either.  An editorial speculated that  
The distinctions which exist in the phrase ‗freedom of speech,‘ are recognized in 
the discrimination between the ‗discussions‘ and the ‗results‘ of the discussions.  
Publicity at the Peace Conference will have general approval, but to imagine that 
such publicity implies the verbatim reporting of the proceedings at Versailles is to 
carry the idea beyond even radical limits.
251
   
 
Full publicity was not ideal because it ―would prevent full and free discussion of some of 
the issues by the delegates or that it would tend to increase the length of the discussion 
and to make appeals to popular sympathy against particular proposals, irrespective of their 
merits, the order of the day.‖
252
  The newspaper‘s editors (including Dafoe) felt that it 
would not be in the best interest of the people if everything was made public. It did not 
believe that the people would always know what was right and could be manipulated by 
politicians to advance their agenda at the Conference.  It was more important that those 
attending the Conference could be free from distraction to concentrate on the issues and 
that would not be possible if the press was following their every move. 
It is important to note that Canadian newspapers were influenced by the American 
President and the British press on this issue.  When mentioning the issue of freedom of the 
press and censorship, they often quoted the first of Wilson‘s Fourteen Points that called 
for ―Open Covenants of Peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private 
international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and 
in the public view.‖
253
  The press was determined that the politicians and diplomats in 
Paris would follow through on this promise.  The Canadian press was generally in favour 
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of openness in international diplomacy.  It was their belief that secret diplomacy had 
helped lead to the Great War.  It was important for the press to be able to reveal all that 
was going on in international diplomacy, so that the public knew the truth.   
The Globe wrote that The Times of London had warned against censorship of the 
press, because it could lead to rumours and half-truths.
254
  The Free Press when 
presenting the case for freedom of the press used the arguments of C. P. Scott, the editor 
of the Manchester Guardian.
255
  The Manitoba newspaper also reported on January 15 
about the protest by American and British newspaper correspondents against a daily 
communiqué being the only source of information about the meetings at the 
Conference.
256
   Canadian newspapers often followed the lead of their American and 
British counterparts.   
On the front page of the December 20 edition, The Globe reported that there would 
be no censorship at the conference.  It reported that ―The Times strongly warns against the 
rumor that the British reports of the conference are to be censored.  The paper says there 
could be nothing worse than an atmosphere of half truths of which there has been enough 
already.‖
257
  The Free Press pointed out that one of Wilson‘s Fourteen Points was ―open 
covenants of peace openly arrived at.‖
258
  There could be no more peace treaties secretly 
negotiated and imposed on a public that had not been informed of the negotiations. It was 
therefore the duty of the press around the world to report on the peace conference 
negotiations.  It was also the duty of the press to ignore rumours, and to concentrate on the 
truth. 
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 Canadian newspapers entered the post-war period with a strong sense of optimism.  
The newspapers were glad the war was over, and hoped that the country‘s efforts would 
be rewarded with representation at the Peace Conference.  The sense of optimism carried 
over to the way the press wrote about the upcoming Peace Conference.  There was a sense 
that Canada was being reborn in a new era of international relations.  The newspapers had 
many ideas on how the Peace Conference would be conducted and what would be 
discussed. Canada should get representation at the Conference and Canadian newspapers 
should be free to report about it.   The press outlined goals that the Conference should 
attempt to achieve. Germany should pay reparation and the Kaiser should somehow be 
punished.  While the newspapers reflected the opinion that Germany was responsible and 
must be punished, they at the same time acknowledged the conditions in Europe, such as 
secret diplomacy, the balance of power and arms races had led to the war.  Finally, a 
League of Nations should be created to maintain world peace and prevent another war 
from happening. 
Looking at Canadian newspaper writing during this three month period, some 
themes emerge.  Big ideas were seldom big on specifics. An international police force 
garnered comment, but no newspaper offered any ideas on where the troops would come 
from, who would command them, and where they would based.  The newspapers were so 
happy about the end of the war that perhaps they ended up being a bit naive about how 
easy it would be to have a Peace Conference.  Peace was of vital importance.  The press 
reflected war fatigue and the conviction that such a war should never happen again. Many 
of the goals the Canadian newspaper pushed for, such as the League of Nations, an end to 
old diplomacy, and end to conscription, punishing Germany properly, putting the Kaiser 
61 
 
on trial and a just peace, were all goals which would hopefully prevent war from 
happening again.  Canada should also be rewarded with representation at the Peace 
Conference for the role it had played during the war.  The press believed that Canada‘s 
role in the war had earned it representation.  It wanted to see Canada continue to be an 
integral part of the Empire, but also to be able to speak on the international scene outside 
of the Empire.  Hopefully, Canada would be able to contribute and help get rid of the old 
diplomacy which plagued the world.   
Finally, Canadian newspapers were unhappy with how the world had conducted 
international affairs before the war. The press suspected that these old fashioned strategies 
had led to the war. The balance of power, secret treaties and old diplomacy were no longer 
viable.  It was important that steps be taken for a new era of international diplomacy, an 
era that was open and which the press could freely report on so that the world‘s citizens 





Chapter 3  
February 1919 to June 1919 – The Peace Conference 
  
It was a momentous time for Canada when Parliament opened on February 20, 
1919 for the first time in nine months.  The leader of the opposition and Liberal leader 
since 1887, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, had passed away three days earlier.  The Prime Minister 
and several of his top Cabinet Ministers were absent in Europe taking part in a peace 
conference that had begun to falter.  When the Governor General, the Duke of Devonshire, 
rose to give the speech from the throne it was on a note of sorrow and with some of 
Canada‘s most distinguished politicians missing.  It was hardly the expected 
circumstances of the first Parliament since the end of the war.   
From February to June 1919, Canada‘s newspapers continued to have many of the 
same priorities as they had during the planning months before the conference.  However, 
the optimism of the months immediately after the war was replaced by the realization that 
there was months of work ahead.  The news from Europe had begun to worsen as 
delegates at the Peace Conference were having disputes and there was unrest across the 
continent.  While Canada gained representation at the Peace Conference, the reality of 
what this representation meant soon set in.  There would be limitations.  While Canada‘s 
representatives may have been full members of the Conference and members of the British 
Empire delegation, it did not mean that anyone took into account what they had to say.  
Also, high hopes about a new era in open diplomacy began to fade, as some countries 
continued to conduct diplomacy in the old way. 
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Canadian newspapers were also more conciliatory.  While Germany was still 
expected to play no part in the Conference, Canadian newspapers reported on the hope 
that Germany would eventually join the League of Nations.  Germany must still pay 
reparations, but some of the Canadian newspapers argued that Germany could not pay 
what it did not have, and that it was no use wrecking the country over the issue.  There 
was also concern over issues such as Italy walking out of the Conference in late April, and 
fear the US would fail to ratify the treaty throughout the Conference.  
The Throne Speech itself and the comment it generated highlighted the concern 
that the government needed to turn its attention to domestic issues. The News Record 
noted that Parliament had been neglected for so long.  It noted that Parliament:  
Has not met since May 24 last and the consequent interrupted interregnum by the 
cabinet has been unnaturally long and unprecedently [sic] complete. It has been the 
era of order in council.  The cabinet has been not only the executive branches of 
government, in accordance with our recognized place in our system, but by virtue 
of the War Measures Act, itself passed by Parliament, has also assumed legislative 
functions formerly confined to the house of commons and the senate.
259
   
 
While Borden had been trying to raise Canada‘s international profile overseas, the Throne 
Speech focussed mainly on domestic issues and the role Canada played in the war.  The 
speech began by praising Canada‘s accomplishments:  
Since the last session of Parliament events have transpired of the highest 
consequence to the Empire and to Canada.  After withstanding with steadfast 
valour repeated assaults pressed with the utmost vigour and determination, the 
Allied Forces, taking the offensive in all theatres of action, advanced to decisive 
and overwhelming victory.
260
   
 
The Governor-General went on to say that:  
In the notable victories leading to the glorious issue accomplished by the arms of 
the Allies, none of the forces engaged bore a more valorous or heroic part than 
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those of Canada, whose achievements throughout the entire war have won 
imperishable renown for their country.  It is most gratifying to be able to state that, 
in the final and decisive stages of the mighty struggle our divisions in the field 
were maintained at over-strength, and equipped in the highest degree with all the 




The same reasons the government had used in the previous months to help Canada gain 
representation at the Peace Conference were also to promote the government‘s agenda in 
Parliament.  
The Governor General also spoke of an ambitious post-war domestic agenda.  The 
government would present: 
A Bill relating to the franchise, with such provisions as are necessary having 
regard to existing conditions, and providing among other things for effectually 
enabling women to vote, and conferring upon them the privilege of sitting in 




There would also be bills to finance the construction of highways, to assist returned 
soldiers to set up farms, to introduce farm establishment policies, to promote vocational 
education, create a Department of Public Health, and to continue the prohibition and 
importation of alcohol.
263
  Many of these issues would be debated by the newspapers in 
the coming months.   
There were several references in the Governor General‘s speech that touched 
directly or indirectly on the Peace Conference.  The Governor General acknowledged that:  
A Conference is now being held at Paris to determine the conditions upon which 
peace will be concluded. As the decisions of this Conference will be of vital 
importance to Canada as well as to other parts of the Empire, it is being attended 
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He did not mention what role Canada would play or what priorities his advisers would 
have. The importance of this Conference was magnified by the fact that the Prime 
Minister himself was missing the Throne Speech to attend this conference. 
Another item mentioned by the Governor General that related to the Peace 
Conference concerned Canadian businesses and industries: 
After more than four years of war, and notwithstanding the sudden dislocation 
brought about by the armistice, Canada‘s industrial, commercial and financial 
stability has been well maintained.  It is the expectation that in addition to business 
arising from the resumption of public and private undertakings in Canada which 
were suspended by the war, and needed improvements and betterments throughout 
the Dominion, Canada will obtain substantial participation in the expansion of 
export trade following the conclusion of the war, and the liberation of commerce 
from the restraints which have existed during its continuance.  Steps have been 




The speech emphasized how important it was for Canada to attend the Peace Conference 
so that Canada‘s interests were protected and to make sure the country received its fair 
share of trade and reparations after the war.  The Peace Conference was about more than 
settling the war, for Canada it was also a trade mission.  Whether or not Canada would 
receive reparations itself, the Prime Minister wanted to make sure that reparations paid to 
other Allied countries would be spent in Canada to ease the nation‘s finances.  The 
government insisted that Borden be in Paris so that he could boost Canada‘s visibility and 
promote the country to other nations who might be looking for trading partners once the 
peace was concluded.  However, the peace needed to be concluded, and therefore it was in 
Canada‘s interest to see this take place quickly. 
The Throne Speech also emphasized the importance of the Empire:  
The deeply loyal and earnest co-operation of the Overseas Dominions and 
Dependencies with the Mother Country must more firmly cement for all time those 
ties which bind the Empire in indissoluble union. The spirit born of common 
                                                     
265
 Ibid, 2. 
66 
 
sacrifice, suffering and heroic endeavour will also, it is confidently hoped, 
permanently unite the Allies by the bonds of a great memory and tradition, and 
effectually promote the formation of a League of Nations which will ensure for all 




The first sentence was intended to calm all those who may have feared that Canada‘s 
participation in the Peace Conference and the proposed League would push Canada away 
from the Empire.  Despite Canada pushing for more international recognition, it was 
important to stress that the members of the Empire remain united.  The war was an 
example of how strong the Empire could be when it worked toward a common goal.  
Therefore, if all the Allies could come and work together to form a League of Nations, the 
world would have a much better chance of keeping the peace. 
The Throne Speech said a lot about Canada‘s position after the war.  It portrayed 
the image of a proud Canada that had undergone a devastating war, yet had managed to 
maintain stability at home.  Reforms had to be made to ensure Canada‘s stability and 
prosperity.  The speech also demonstrated that the government felt that it had good reason 
to be over in Paris attending the Peace Conference.  By submitting the speech for 
Parliament‘s approval, they were also getting tacit approval for their actions in Paris.   
The Paris Peace Conference officially opened on January 18, 1919 in the Quai 
d‘Orsay.
267
  The Globe was very pleased with the opening of the Conference and what it 
foretold of future diplomacy.  It heralded a new age of ―honest diplomacy,‖ and what The 
Globe called the ―first inspiring adoption of the new diplomacy of the square deal.‖
268
  
Using another metaphor, the conference was a place where ―powers frankly place their 
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cards on the public peace table for free discussion and deliberation by the nations.‖
269
  The 
paper was pleased to see this new openness in action. 
Yet the conference did not get off to a good start for Canada.  Britain, France and 
the US had decided already that Canada would get two representatives, equal to that of the 
other small powers.  Also, Canada would get a representative on the British Empire panel. 
The British Empire delegation was made up of four members from Britain, and one 
member who belonged to a panel on a rotating seat for representatives of the Dominions, 
and other representatives from Britain.  However, the night before the Conference was to 
begin, without consulting the Dominions, the Big Three decided that Belgium and Serbia 
would get three representatives.  Borden was embarrassed because the press at home had 
already been told to expect equal representation.  He even discussed with Arthur Sifton the 
prospect of returning home to protest the move.  Canada was represented by George 
Foster and Arthur Sifton at the inaugural session.  Borden was to have been the fifth 
member of the British Empire delegation but he was pushed out at the last moment for the 




The newspapers in late January may have seen the effects of Dafoe‘s 
communications back to Canada.  On January 15, Dafoe‘s paper reported that Canada 
would receive ―equal status in the conference with the smaller allied nations.‖
271
  On 
January 16, the press reported how Lloyd George had ―brilliantly fought‖ for the 
Dominions to have equal representation with the smaller nations.
272
  The opening of the 
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Conference was then reported on January 20, and nothing was said of the sudden change 
of representation for Serbia and Belgium.  It was a non-event for the Canadian press.  The 
news of Canada‘s slight was lost amongst the news of the start of the Conference. 
The issue that drew the ire of Borden and the Canadian press was the dominance 
of the five main Allied countries.  Borden noticed this on January 21 and wrote Lloyd 
George complaining that of the 10 days spent in Paris so far, only one meeting of the 
entire Conference had been held and that all the decisions had been made by two 
representatives of each of the five large Allied countries.  Canada finally had a chance to 
speak out at a second plenary session. Borden complained about the lack of input smaller 
nations had and he was curious as to who was making the decisions and by what authority.  
Clemenceau made a speech in reply which came down to two points: the great powers had 
called the Conference, and therefore they would control it.
273
 
In February, The Globe reported on Borden‘s concerns.  Reports from Paris 
confirmed that most of the decisions were being made by Great Britain, the United States, 
Italy, France and Japan.  The Globe complained that smaller nations ―ought to have more 
say at Peace Conference.‖
274
  The Canadian representatives were having ―difficulty in 
reconciling the war efforts and national status of their dominions with the standing they 
are accorded at the Peace Conference especially in relation to ‗the cabinet.‘‖
275
  Canada 
had standing but it was not getting the opportunity to influence the proceedings. 
The Free Press was also concerned, reflecting the anxieties of J.W. Dafoe.  
Norman Lambert, the Secretary of the Canadian Council of Agriculture, and a former staff 
writer for The Globe, wrote that the Canadians had not ―enjoyed quite the important place 
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in the deliberations at Paris that they were given reason to expect.‖
276
  The problem was 
procedural.  While Canada was a member of the British Empire panel, the top powers 
were only meeting with two members of each country to make the Council of Ten.  
Canada‘s representation was not merely a matter of symbolism for the Canadian press, but 
it was also a matter of actually representing Canada‘s interests as effectively as possible. 
Canada‘s representatives were not going to settle for merely symbolic 
representation and newspapers soon began to report on the progress made by Canada on 
this matter.  Not long after the press began to report that Canada was having trouble 
making its representation count, they began to see evidence that in some ways Canada was 
making a difference.  However, it came not through its representation at the Conference, 
but through its membership in the British Empire.  As a result of a member of the British 
delegation being absent, Borden was chosen to represent the British Empire at the Council 
of Ten.
277
  The Globe argued that ―it is a precedent undoubtedly, for extending similar 
privileges to other overseas premiers as occasion arises.‖
278
  The Globe wanted to see 
more power distributed within the Empire to the Dominions. 
Canada‘s representatives took part in other aspects of the conference in a more 
direct role, rather than through the Empire.  They served on conference committees and 
examined issues and prepared conference reports.  Borden sat on both the Commission for 
the Greek and Albanian questions, and the Commission on the Russian Question.  Sifton 
sat on the Commission on the International Regime of Rivers, Ports and Railways.
279
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Foster, Sifton and Doherty served on two powerful economic committees, the Economic 
Commission and the Supreme Economic Council.  
The Free Press thought ―the economic interests of all the British Dominions will 
be well looked after‖ by these representatives.
280
  But Canada‘s representation caused 
some consternation back home against fears that Canada‘s newfound representation and 
international stature would dilute the Empire.  Perhaps these Canadians were fearful after 
reading General Currie‘s comments, that ―in the relations between Great Britain and the 
Dominions every suggestion of political inferiority must be removed.‖
281
  It might seem to 
some Canadians that Canada was trying to break from the Empire.  The Globe had no 
problems in dismissing these critics:  
Critics who see in the national status attained by Canada in her decision not to be 
treated as an underling at the Peace Conference the breaking up of the Empire 
deserve to rank with the gloomy pessimists who harrowed the hearts of the Allied 
peoples during the war and have been trying to drive them to the limits of despair 
during the armistice period.
282
 
   
Not everyone was content with the future for Canada that Borden was directing in Europe.  
But, The Globe was not going to back down and had decided that the course chosen by 
Canada was the right one. 
 There had been doubts about the usefulness of Borden being in Paris since he had 
left Canada in November.  The Free Press wrote an editorial in December dismissing his 
critics as being out of touch with reality. The centre of world power had moved to 
Versailles, and Borden was needed there to represent Canada.
283
  The problem resurfaced 
in February, 1919 with The Globe wondering ―would it not be possible for the Premier of 
                                                     
280
 Manitoba Free Press, Mar. 1, 1919, 1, Glazebrook, Canada and the Paris Peace Conference, 138. 
281
 The Globe, June 12, 1919, 6. 
282
 Ibid, May 7, 1919, 6. 
283
 Manitoba Free Press, Dec. 12, 1918, 11. 
71 
 
Canada also to come home and put a little energy into the Administration of Ottawa?‖
284
  
While The Globe approved of the direction that Borden was leading Canada, the 
newspaper thought it was time he left Canada‘s representation at the Conference to lower 
representatives.  With all the important objectives, such as representation and supporting 
the other Dominions achieved, The Globe asked:  
Is there any reason why the Premier of Canada should remain in Paris in what is 
manifestly a subordinate capacity until the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia and 
Poland are arranged, the tangled mess of Balkan intrigue is sorted out, and the last 




The Globe did not think this was important and that ―Canada‘s work must be done on this 
continent.  It is a great work, worthy of the best that is in the Canadian people.‖
286
 The 
newspaper also went on to criticize Borden‘s interest in diplomacy and wrote that his 
resulting absences from the country were not good.  The Globe argued that Borden had a 
role to play in Paris, but with that role now over, he should return to Canada.  The 
newspaper saw him as a capable Prime Minister, however, more attention needed to be 
paid to domestic issues. 
 When Dafoe returned to Canada in March he was interviewed by the press. In the 
interview, he dismissed Borden‘s critics.  Dafoe said: 
Criticism of the presence of Sir Robert Borden and his colleagues in Paris—of 
which there appears to be a good deal in Canada— . . . must be based upon a 
reluctance to face the realities of the situation.  Those who take this view are 




As well Dafoe said that:  
It would be an admission that a colonial status marks the limits of our capacity and 
desires.  There is no domestic question that can be weighed in the same balance 
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with the issues that await settlement at Paris; and the Premier of Canada, in my 
opinion, is precisely where he should be when is in Paris as the chief Canadian 
representative.
288
   
 
Borden‘s choice of Dafoe as the official press correspondent had definitely paid off.  
Dafoe was a strong defender of Borden.  The arguments over whether Borden should be in 
Paris or Canada also demonstrated that Canadians may not have seen the Paris Peace 
Conference as quite as important as later historians have seen it.  
 The Canadian press had generally a favourable view of Borden.  They recognized 
the important role Borden was playing for Canada at the Peace Conference.  Much of his 
good press was probably due to his appointing Dafoe as official press correspondent.  
However, the press were not afraid to criticize him when they felt he was not doing the 
right thing. 
According to Canadian newspapers, there was no doubt anymore in Britain about 
Canada‘s status.  The Globe reported that ―British statesman at any rate are no longer in 
any doubt regarding the feeling overseas that their countries are entitled to greater 
consideration than some whose war efforts they have beaten on any comparison.‖
289
  The 
newspaper pointed out that feeling was high in Canada for greater consideration at the 
Conference.  And again, it was the war effort that had laid the groundwork for this greater 
consideration.  Canada‘s war effort had done much to improve its image in Britain. 
As Canada‘s war efforts were used to secure representation at the Peace 
Conference, Canada‘s representation was used to secure membership as a fully 
independent nation at the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization.  
The Free Press wrote that ―the status of the British Dominions as fixed by the peace 
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conference has been carried over into the constitution of the league of nations.‖
290
  Not as 
much effort had to be spent to get Canada representation at the League of Nations, as for 
the most part it was carried over from its victory to secure Canada representation at the 
Peace Conference.   
Ideas on the League of Nations continued to develop as the Conference began.  
Woodrow Wilson believed if the League was left until after the Conference, other nations 
would lose interest.  The peace settlement had to be based on the League of Nations 
principle and he did not want to see it hurried through for the sake of expedience.
291
  
Canadian newspapers were greatly interested in the League of Nations and wrote many 
editorial pieces on its importance.  They examined the various issues concerning the 
League of Nations such as arbitration, enforcement, preserving the peace, what to do with 
enemy countries and what would happen if the League failed.  The League of Nations was 
debated throughout the months that the Peace Conference was in session.  Through that 
time the tone of the newspapers went from optimistic and naive at the start, to a more 
realistic and desperate tone in April and May. All three newspapers supported the lofty 
goals of the League of Nations, but they often failed to provide details on how the many 
facets of the League would function.  Overall, Canadian newspapers saw the League as 
vitally important to future world peace and something that all countries must do their best 
to maintain and promote. 
The three newspapers were overwhelming in their belief of the importance of the 
future League.  For The Globe, the League would ―descend to posterity as far more 
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important than November 11, the day of the armistice,‖
292
 and ―there is no doubt that the 
constitution of the League of Nations is the most important document yet known to human 
history, and its promulgation, whatever be its ultimate fate, marks an epoch in the record 
of the world.‖  The Globe, yet again, enjoyed using religious imagery in its descriptions of 
the importance of the Peace Conference and what it might achieve.  The Free Press tried 
to outdo The Globe with its praise: ―the proposal of a league of nations comes before all 
other considerations.  It is so important that no thoughtful man can refuse to give it his 
support.‖
293
  As well, ―what Magna Charta did for the English and their descendants the 
constitution of the League of Nations will do for mankind.‖
294
  Finally, the League was 
―an achievement certain to be of incalculable value to future generations of mankind.‖
295
  
The newspapers were very optimistic in their hopes for the League.  Calling it the most 
important document in human history, and comparing it to the Magna Charta, an 
important document in British constitutional history, underlined these hopes.   
The primary goal of the League was to preserve world peace.  Canadian 
newspapers were very passionate about this subject and believed the League was 
something that could best accomplish this goal.  The Free Press put it in very elegant 
terms:  
The war against the antithetic conception of a world dominated by one almighty 
race has crystallised the sentiment into a powerful desire for an international 
organization prepared to maintain the independence and secure the safety of each 
individual state embraced in it.
296
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For the newspaper maintaining world peace was very much connected to maintaining the 
autonomy and borders of individual states.  The best option to provide this security was 
the League of Nations. 
This goal of the League was far more important than anything else going on at the 
Peace Conference.  Even near the end of the Peace Conference The News Record wrote 
that ―the framing of the peace terms and obtaining the signatures of the belligerents 
thereto will subsequently dwarf into significance as compared to the establishment of a 
league of nations to preserve peace.‖
297
  The News Record stated the importance of an 
international organization to preserve the peace, the countries of the world ―do not desire 
to fight another war and therefore see the necessity of getting the leading nations of the 
world to sign a covenant to preserve peace.‖
298
  It was the League itself that would 
preserve the peace.  The world did not want another war; therefore, countries had a 
responsibility to sign the League of Nations covenant.  
Canadian newspapers also saw the prevention of war as a job of a future peace 
treaty.  Their editors described the representatives and the represented nations as seeing 
themselves on a mission to bring a lasting peace to the world.  On February 25, The News 
Record had the headline: ―Nations striving to make war an impossibility.‖
299
  In another 
article it stated that ―The majority of nations are convinced that war should be forever 
abolished.‖
300
  Canadian newspapers seemed to believe their own rhetoric that the Peace 
Conference could possibly end war forever.  
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Arbitration continued to be an important part of the League of Nations for 
Canadian newspapers into 1919.  When the draft covenant of the League of Nations came 
out on February 13, 1919 and The News Record wrote a few days later that: 
The kernel of the constitution adopted lies in Article 2, which provides that the 
British Empire, the United States, France, Italy and Japan and other signatory 





If any differences were to arise between countries that they could not resolve themselves, 
one of the nations had the right to take the dispute to the League to seek resolution.  A 
country‘s sovereignty would be limited as it now would have to accept the decisions of a 
higher authority. 
This loss of sovereignty did not seem to bother Canadian newspapers.  Despite the 
fact that the Canadian government was trying to expand Canada‘s powers in Paris with 
international representation, they were at the same time prepared to lose control over some 
aspect of their affairs.  The News Record wrote that ―the great gain to humanity has been 
in the adoption of the principle of compulsory arbitration.‖
302
  Canadians newspapers saw 
the League as an important place to solve international disputes since any country that 
submitted their dispute would have to accept the decision of the League. 
The Free Press wrote on February 13 that:  
If the country which the decision of the arbitrators places in the wrong does not 
accept the ruling of the arbitrators and has recourse to arms, not only the forces of 
the other contending party in the dispute, but the forces of all the nations in a 
position to help will take up arms against it.
303
   
 
This issue was related to Article X of the League of Nations covenant which was under 
much debate in March 1919. The article stated that: 
                                                     
301
 Ibid, Feb. 19, 1919, 4. 
302
 Ibid, May 20, 1919, 4. 
303
 Manitoba Free Press, Feb. 13, 1919, 2. 
77 
 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all states 
members of the League.  In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or 
danger of such aggression the Executive Council shall advise upon the means by 




Glazebrook noted that Borden and the Canadian delegates had three problems with this 
article. They worried it made all borders permanent and just, and that whoever signed the 
treaty would be responsible to see that it remained this way.
305
  This article potentially put 
Canada in a difficult position of having to guarantee the borders of a Europe that were still 
seething with turmoil.  Doherty submitted a memorandum, and Borden raised the issue at 




The Globe, noting Canada‘s objections suggested that: 
No fault can be found with the Canadians for making known their attitude in 
respect to the article that has been more freely discussed than any other section of 




The three newspapers did not seem particularly concerned about the potential difficulties 
that could arise from the proposed article.  However, they were anxious that if Canada was 
to make any protest, that it should do its best to prepare an amendment.  It also appeared 
that The Globe honestly believed that Canada could make a difference with the League 
covenant with further efforts. 
The idea that the League of Nations opened the possibility of accepting the rulings 
of a higher power raised considerable comment.  The Free Press wrote that ―the covenant 
of the League of Nations represents a long advance on the older conception of the 
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inviolability of the rights of sovereignty enjoyed by a nation; but any large surrender to an 
international body of autonomous power is still a long way in the future.‖
308
  The covenant 
would break new ground in its move towards restricting some rights of nations.  However, 
the Free Press believed that any large surrender of rights was still far off.  The paper was 
not very concerned that nations who joined the League would lose many national rights.  
It was interesting though, that the newspaper would be so eager to gain greater equality 
within the Empire, while prepared to surrender rights to the new League of Nations. 
All three newspapers supported the idea that force could be needed to enforce 
League decisions.  The Free Press wrote that ―at the present stage of the world‘s 
development, the possibility of employing force must always be the moral authority 
behind the League‘s findings.‖
309
  In order for the League‘s decisions to have a moral 
backing, they must be enforceable.  If League decisions had no enforcement mechanism 
then no one would abide by its decisions.  The newspaper saw the League as gaining its 
authority from morality. Such an authority had to be enforced. 
Some countries, the French in particular, wanted some kind of international army 
or world police.  France‘s aim was to have a huge international army stationed on their 
soil, the strategic centre of Europe, to protect it from future aggression.
310
  According to 
Canadian newspapers France saw itself as the principle victim of the war, and had the 
most to lose by a peace treaty that failed to give it adequate protection.  However, the 
Canadian press never offered any detailed explanations on how an international army 
would work or how it would be formed.  It suggested that there were positive things that 
could happen as a result of creating a world police force.  The News Record wrote that ―by 
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having a world police force, it will enable the member nations to reduce their present 
armaments, since they will not be building against each other.‖
311
  With less need for 
countries to maintain standing armies to protect their sovereignty, countries could reduce 
their armed forces and see a decrease in armaments around the world. 
The view was that enforcing the League‘s decisions would make the world become 
a much more peaceful place.  If the League was able to arbitrate between countries, to 
make judgments, and if necessary was able to enforce the judgement, the League would 
become the ultimate court.  The Globe decided that if countries joined the League and 
accepted its decisions, eventually, it would become ―the court of last resort of the nations, 
with ample authority and power to carry its judgement into effect.‖
312
  No country could 
defy the League because it could enforce its decisions resulting in all countries respecting 
it as the final court. 
It was of primary importance that this League be made up of as many nations as 
possible.  An all-encompassing international organization could contribute much more 
than the Great Powers working together.  The Globe wrote that the League would ―exert a 
far more powerful influence in the direction of world peace and the enforcement of 
international law than could any voluntary concert of the Great Powers.‖
313
  Global 
cooperation was important.  The Great War had shown what could happen if all nations 
did not work together, and The Globe honestly believed the League could make a 
difference.  It may be easy to say the newspaper was naive in its opinions at this later date, 
but at this time there was no sign that the United States would not join the League. 
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There were a number of things that Canadian newspapers thought the League 
should do to make it more meaningful.  One was to incorporate into the League the former 
enemy countries such as Germany, Austria and Hungary, as well as Russia.  The Globe 
stated that ―if there is to be a League worthy [of] the name these countries cannot be 
barred out indefinitely.‖
314
  It also wrote that ―if the world ever is to emerge from the 
horrors of recurring wars there must eventually be a real League of Nations, which shall 
include Germany and Russia.‖
315
  For The Globe, the League would not be ―worthy‖ or 
―real‖ unless these other countries joined.  It could not truly be a League of Nations until 
all countries, especially the former enemy powers in Europe became members.  Without 
them, the League had the potential to soon become irrelevant. 
The News Record also recognized the importance of the League, especially of its 
importance to the Peace Treaty.  When news came out in June that the American Senate 
wished to remove the League Covenant from the Peace Terms, the paper was upset.  It 
wrote that ―the League of Nations covenant is the keystone of the arch.  Remove it and the 
arch will fall.‖
316
  The Covenant of the League of Nations would, in the opinion of the 
newspapers, guarantee world peace.  Without the League to oversee the peace terms, the 
newspaper‘s editors feared that the entire exercise would collapse. 
The Free Press examined in great depth what would happen if the League failed.  
First, the new League had to be adaptable to change.  The League needed to ―grow and 
adapt itself to rapidly changing conditions from the very outset; otherwise it will fail.‖
317
  
The advance to war in 1914 proved this point.  The constantly changing situation and 
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involved powers provided no stable situation.  The Free Press realized that the League‘s 
success was not guaranteed, despite it being such a great idea. This was in stark contrast to 
the newspaper‘s earlier highly optimistic comments about the League. 
Secondly, the Canadian newspapers had the opinion that the League could also fail 
if it did not have the support of all member nations.  The League would be ―a living 
organism only if its initial constitution commands general support; to travel too fast and to 
fly too high will result in failure.‖
318
  The Free Press carefully provided some ways on 
how the League could fail, but it also stated why the League must not fail:  
The attempt to set up an international society; however crude and imperfect at its 
inception must not fail.  Reversion to the old state of affairs would be an appalling 
disaster.  It would mean the tearing up of international law at a time when every 
nation is confronting internal conditions which would make another world-




There was little optimism to be found in the language used by the Free Press.  The 
newspaper was desperately worried that all Canadians had fought for would be lost.  It 
even acknowledged that the League of Nations was not perfect, but was the best solution 
under the increasingly dire circumstances facing the Peace Conference.  The lofty 
optimism of the late fall and early winter was not longer evident. 
 The newspapers quoted several representatives at the conference who believed in 
the importance of ending war.  At the start of the Peace Conference, the Canadian 
representative, Charles Doherty, was quoted as saying: ―the prevention of war is not the 
concern of governmental power alone. It is in the interest of humanity itself.‖
320
  One 
month later, Lord Robert Cecil, one of the British representatives and one of the first to 
develop the idea of the League of Nations, was quoted as saying:  
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But after all nothing that is worth doing in this world can be done without sacrifice 
and if any real change in the present international anarchy is to take place it can 
only be because the nations of the world are so convinced of the horrible evils of 




The two representatives both presented the idea that it was in humanity‘s interest to bring 
an end to war.  Humanity had to realize how evil war was and had to make the necessary 
sacrifice to end it.  Throughout the Conference there were delegates pushing for this lofty 
goal. 
 During discussions at the Peace Conference in February, The News Record noted 
that one idea that was constantly brought forward was ―not to frame rights under which 
war can be humanely conducted but to render war impossible.‖
322
  While certain delegates 
at the Conference only wanted to prevent war, The News Record, wanted to end it 
permanently.  The editorialists at the Free Press became upset when it seemed certain 
newspapers within Canada and the US were forgetting why delegates from their countries 
were meeting in Paris.  It wrote ―there are bigger issues afloat than that of the nice 
apportionment of honor won.  There is the peace and the safety of the world.‖
323
  There 
was anger that representatives in Paris seemed more interested in arguing over whose 
armies were the most responsible for ending the war.  This was not the most important 
thing to be debating the newspaper admonished; the world had to focus on peace. 
 Reparations continued to be discussed as the Conference progressed.  Before the 
Conference began, the newspapers were full of rhetoric demanding German blood, and 
discussing the specifics of what Canada may get in reparations.  After the Conference 
began, the discussion became more realistic.  Canadian newspapers were eager to see that 
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those responsible for starting the war pay for the damage they caused.  They discussed 
how much had to be paid and what form it would take.  Unlike the previous December, 
they also showed a lack of interest in whether or not Canada would receive reparations.  It 
was important that those countries who suffered the most receive the majority of the 
reparations.  There were problems though; the major dilemma for the newspapers was 
how Germany would pay without having its economy benefit from the industries being 
produced. 
 For The News Record ―the first question to be determined is what Germany owes 
and then what she can pay.‖
324
  It had to be determined not only ―what Germany should 
pay in the way of damages but what she is able to pay and how she is to earn the money 
with which to pay.‖
325
  It would be illogical for the Allies to merely demand payment 
without determining exactly how Germany should pay it, and where they should get it.  
The newspaper noted that: 
Another fact contributing to the situation is that early statements regarding 
indemnity claims were based on the idea of taking territory in lieu of money.  
Since it has become evident that the old ―grabbing‖ policy will not be tolerated, an 
adjustment of ideas has become necessary.
326
 
   
The Allies had new standards to live by, and could not simply grab territory to satisfy 
reparations.  Wilson‘s Fourteen Points had laid down how the Allies would deal with 
territory after the war and if they wanted to maintain the respect of the world, they had to 
follow them.  The Allies would have to come up with a more civilized way of having the 
enemies pay reparations. 
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 Reparations provided problems for the Allies.  How could they make the Germans 
pay without seizing territory or allowing their economy to benefit?  The Free Press wrote 
that ―the problem of reparation and restitution is one of the most difficult which the Peace 
Conference is called upon to solve.‖
327
  Both The Globe and the Free Press were worried 
about Germany benefiting from reparations.  The Free Press wrote:  
Public sentiment has demanded that Germany should pay for the war. But blood 
cannot be got from a stone; and it is not desired that German industry should 
benefit by any over-stimulation of industrial production to the detriment of its 




The Globe took a harsher stand, unhappy that Germany had the possibility of making any 
revenue, ―Germany does not grow cash, and she cannot discharge her obligations unless 
she sells her goods.  The fact is unpalatable, but it is unassailable.‖
329
  The problem was 
clear; if Germany were to sell its goods in order to make money to pay the Allies, there 
was a risk that German industries might compete with Allied industries, and that the 
German economy would be over-stimulated so that it could pay all the reparations.  
Although the Allies wanted to receive reparations from Germany they were not 
comfortable with seeing the German economy, thus the German people, benefit in any 
way while the Allies were being paid their just due. 
To the Free Press it was important that Belgium and France benefit from the 
reparations.  The newspaper declared that ―France and Belgium must be rehabilitated.  
The labour and cost of that work ought to be imposed on those who planned and carried 
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out this stupendous crime.‖
330
  The paper understood Belgium and France‘s demand for 
reparations:  
The bitterness underlying the demand of the French and Belgians for restitution 
and reparation by Germany is scarcely comprehensible to people who have not 




Belgium and France had suffered the most and were therefore the most entitled to 
reparations. The damage done to their countries was far greater than that inflicted on any 
other. 
In the end, Canada did share in the monetary reparations received, although only a 
small portion of this was ever paid due to Germany defaulting.
332
  The reporting in the 
Canadian press alternated between the hard-line approach of The Globe, and the softer 
approach of the Free Press and The News Record.  For the hard-liners, reparation was 
more about vengeance for individual cruelty, while the softer approach saw it as a more 
abstract legal and moral issue. 
 Secret treaties and old diplomacy were a topic often talked about in Canadian 
newspapers at the time.  Secret treaties were a ―hindrance to the peace‖
333
 and an 
―injustice‖
334
 that were no longer acceptable in the post-war era.  The dissolution of these 
treaties would be an important goal of Canadian newspapers.  Again, Canadian 
newspapers were using language from Wilson‘s Fourteen Points in their arguments for 
what the world should be trying to accomplish at the Peace Conference. 
For the newspapers, the elimination of secret treaties by the Peace Conference 
would be a great triumph.  The Globe wrote in February about how the ―old order is on the 
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 and how eliminating secret treaties would be a ―triumph over old intrigue.‖
336
  
The Globe saw secret treaties as being ―old‖ and part of something that was dying out.  It 
was also a good thing that they were disappearing, because they were associated with 
devious methods and with war. 
 Canadian newspaper coverage of secret treaties re-emerged in late April and May.  
This was due to Italy walking out of the Conference as a result of being told that the 
Treaty of London, signed in 1915, and kept secret during the war would not be honoured 
in the final peace treaty.  The News Record did not like secret treaties; it was ―evident that 
these had to go before a new and clean leaf could be turned.‖
337
  This meant that 
―diplomats and their underhanded schemes will eventually disappear.  Imperialism was 
having its supply of gasoline cut off.‖
338
  Imperialism, which Canadian newspapers 
believed had been kept alive by the secret conspiring of diplomats, would no longer be 
acceptable and could not be used as means to an end for those countries wishing to extend 
their influence.  Diplomats could no longer conspire and diplomacy would come out into 
the open. 
 The end of the old diplomacy and secret treaties was also associated with the 
coming of the League of Nations.   For the Free Press: 
This repudiation of the time honored, hoary system of secret understandings is one 
of the features of the League of Nations which mark it, despite many compromises 
with the old order, as a great step forward along the long road to a stable world.  
For secret dickering has been to the old diplomacy the very breath of life.
339
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The News Record saw ―the acceptance of the principle on which a League of Nations 
rests, will eradicate secret treaties and the old schemes of alliances between the great 
powers to maintain the balance of power.‖
340
  The League of Nations would bring 
diplomacy into the open.  If diplomats spent too long arguing over treaties and the fine 
print, the people would know.  The League of Nations stood for a principle which would 
no longer accept secret treaties and secret alliances. 
 Unfortunately, the newspapers noted that secret diplomacy and treaties were not 
dead despite The Globe‘s assessment at the start of the Conference.  In March, the Free 
Press noted that ―the procedure at the Peace Conference has been the reverse of 
democratic and has smacked of secret diplomacy.‖
341
  The newspaper was concerned 
about the monopoly of power being held by the Great Powers, and that despite their 
assurances of an open peace, were conducting secret negotiations.  It appeared that despite 
a promising start, the move towards open diplomacy was backsliding and losing 
momentum. 
 There were other problems.  Despite countries‘ efforts to have an open Peace 
Conference, the proceedings were troubled by old secret treaties.  The past haunted the 
representatives and made it difficult for them to adopt the new ways.  The Free Press 
noted in April that secret treaties kept ―turning up at Paris at the most inconvenient and 
inopportune times.‖
342
  All kinds of treaties signed by the powers before and during the 
war concerning Italy, the Balkans and the Middle East, would not die.  Many nations felt 
that they had been promised things from these treaties, such as the Italians and the Treaty 
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of London, and were loathe to give them up.  It turned out not everyone was as excited as 
Canadian newspapers about discarding old treaties. 
Major problems also arose at the conference as a result of the Italian delegation.  
Macmillan wrote that the argument between the Italians and the rest of the Council of 
Four was over not only territory, but also principle. The Italians stood firm on the old 
diplomacy while the Americans on the new.
343
  In the treaty of London signed in 1915, the 
Italians had been promised parts of Austria-Hungary, a stretch of the Dalmatian coast, the 
Dodecanese Islands, parts of the Ottoman Empire if it were to disappear and a protectorate 
over Albania.
344
  The problems developed with the French and British who considered the 
Treaty of London an embarrassment and with the Americans who considered themselves 
not bound by any secret treaties.
345
  The quarrel culminated on April 24, 1919, when the 
Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando walked out of the Conference and returned to 
Italy.  The main headline on the Free Press read ―Italy Withdraws from Peace Table as 
Result of the Adriatic Deadlock.‖
346
  On the same day, The Globe, separated its main page 




The Canadian press noted that the Italian problem was complex and could have 
disastrous results for the conference and for Europe.  The Free Press wrote that the Italian 
problem was ―as complex and insoluble as the Balkan problem to which it is closely 
allied.‖
348
  The Globe foresaw revolution in Italy as a result of Italy‘s claims not being 
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  Allied leaders would have to treat the problem very carefully and do their best to 
solve it.  The Globe wrote that ―it will be a real disaster to the cause of universal peace if 
the Italians persist in their present attitude.‖
350
  The newspaper did not want the delegates 
getting sidetracked from the most important issue, which was peace. 
 While the Peace Conference had begun with optimism and hope, it did not take 
long for a disappointment to settle around Paris and in the Canadian newspapers.  Many 
problems developed and the Peace Conference slowed with representatives arguing over 
seemingly trivial matters.  One of the strongest proponents of the League of Nations, the 
American President Woodrow Wilson, appeared to be losing the support of Congress and 
it appeared as though the US would not even ratify the treaty.  Wilson was at odds with 
Congress, and refused to compromise to appease some of the moderate republicans.
351
  
Germany was enduring domestic difficulties and was proving to be difficult to deal with, 
threatening to refuse to sign the treaty.  Finally, domestic problems in Canada escalated 
into the Winnipeg General Strike, which actually saw the Free Press cease production for 
a few days.  The euphoria from the Allied victory in the war had died off, and reality had 
begun to sink in revealing many problems and a Peace Conference that might not solve 
them.  
 The United States was an important country at the Peace Conference.  President 
Wilson had pushed many of the ideas which motivated the Conference.  The US was also 
seen by Canadian newspapers as a moral authority and a country that could mediate the 
competing interests at the Conference.  The creation of the League of Nations was very 
important for the Conference‘s success.  On February 4, The News Record had the 
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headline: ―Success of League depends largely on U.S.‖ splashed across the front page.
 352
  
The Globe noted that ―Paris awaits anxiously attitude of U.S. on League of Nations.‖
353
  
The Peace Conference depended to a large part on the US, and was very sensitive to its 
mood.  Its economics and military strength made it a strong country, one that could 
convince other countries to follow its lead. 
 The importance of American leadership was highlighted in several papers.  The 
News Record wrote that ―it is absolutely vital that America shall assume a moral 
leadership in the league‘s affairs.‖
354
  It was important for the US to lay out ideas on how 
international society will now function.  The News Record was pleased with how the US 
was providing this leadership.  It noted that ―under the old scheme of things, it could have 
bargained for its assistance and obtained a large slice off some continent.‖
355
  Rather, the 
US ―enunciated the principle that there should not be a division of spoils and proposed 
that it be a peace of justice, with provisions for the formation of a league of nations to 
preserve the peace of the world.‖
356
  The news paper wanted to see more leadership that 
would set the agenda for a freer and more peaceful world. 
 As the Peace Conference continued, there was fear that the US would abandon the 
role it had taken for itself on the international stage and return to isolation.  This problem 
especially came to the forefront in late February when Wilson returned temporarily to the 
US.  Wilson made a rousing speech in Boston which The Globe described as:  
Throwing down the glove of defiance at all Senators and others who oppose the 
League of Nations, and challenging them to combat with him, President Wilson 
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signalized the first day of his return in a way that gave the deepest comfort to those 




The Globe wrote that Wilson‘s enemies in Congress had declared war on the League of 
Nations.
358
  There was a segment of Congress that was highly opposed to the United 
States joining the League of Nations.  The News Record quoted Senator Poindexter from 
Washington as asking whether:  
To surrender to an international council and body of delegates those high functions 
of sovereignty which heretofore we have exercised for ourselves, and to rest in the 
jurisdiction of an international league the determination of our armaments, the 
decision of peace or war, even in the most vital questions affecting our honor, 




The serious problem for those opposing the League of Nations was the fear that the US 
would be giving up a substantial portion of its sovereignty as a membership fee.  The Free 
Press saw American opposition to the League of Nations differently.  The newspaper 
wrote that opposition:  
Comes from two classes of people.  One is composed of those who have been, 
openly or secretly, opposed to the participation of the United States in the war.  
The other consists of those who, having enthusiastically aided in the defeat of the 
Prussian menace would now have the United States retire into its former state of 




Rather than sovereignty it was more an issue of either having opposed the war in the first 
place or isolationism. Nevertheless, the Free Press was not impressed with the argument. 
 The News Record rejected Senator Poindexter‘s argument as well. The newspaper 
described various national laws that most countries have and wrote that:  
It follows that if it be wise to curb, disarm and control would-be disturbers of the 
peace in the national arena, there should be an international code, supported by the 
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If citizens of countries were to have national laws, then there was no reason why countries 
should not have to abide by international laws.  Canadian newspapers wanted to see 
national sovereignty restricted in the name of peace, and they were not afraid to take on 
the United States in their fight for it. 
 If the US were to fail to ratify the peace treaty, the effects would be disastrous 
according to Canadian newspapers.  If the United States Senate rejected the treaty, ―it is 
probable that the league would fall to the ground‖ wrote The News Record.
362
  American 
support was necessary for the League to survive. Without one of the most powerful 
nations of the world, the League would be useless.  For The Globe:  
The rejection of the treaty of peace would mean that there would be no peace 
unless the United States stooped to make a separate agreement with the enemy, an 
alternative which would be scorned by the patriotic self-respect of the American 
people.
363
   
 
The paper seemed to see possible American dismissal of the treaty and the League not so 
much as a result of the lack of public support, but of its politicians.  They believed that 
Americans favoured the League and that they would reject any attempt to return America 
to its isolation. 
By June, The News Record was still worried over American participation in the 
League of Nations.  The newspaper believed that there was considerable opposition in the 
US to the League.
364
  In June, Republicans in the US Senate had introduced a motion to 
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have the League Covenant separated from the peace treaty. 
365
  The newspaper was 
adamant that ―The United States, having participated in the Great War, cannot go back to 
its position of isolation from world affairs.‖
366
  Canadian newspapers wanted the US to 
understand that it had a responsibility to the outside world.  Canadian newspapers were 
very eager for US participation in world affairs.  It seemed as though that since Canada 
was taking a greater role in world affairs, the Canadian press felt that the Americans 
should follow suit. 
 Another troubling issue that arose during the Peace Conference was that of racial 
equality, an issue that had been raised by the Japanese.  Japan wanted racial equality 
established by a clause in the Covenant to the League of Nations.  The amendment as 
proposed by the Japanese diplomat Baron Makino read: 
The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High 
Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of 
States members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no 




This was a new issue for peace conferences, and many of the other nations found it 
troubling.  The main opposition came from the US and Australia.  The British on the other 
hand, hoping to maintain an alliance with Japan, were more conciliatory.  However, when 
the New Zealanders joined the Australians in opposition, the British were forced to 
concede, and oppose the clause proving that the Dominions did have influence in Paris.
368
  
However, for newspapers in Canada the real issue was immigration. 
 The racial equality issue showed that discrimination was alive and well in Canada. 
Canadian newspapers constantly referred to ―the Japs.‖  The main problem for Canadian 
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newspapers was that the racial equality clause could cause Canada to lower its 
immigration barriers to the Japanese.
369
  It seemed important that Canada maintain its 
control over its immigration policies, and to discriminate against who they like.  The News 
Record wrote:  
The white races are willing to trade with Japan on equal terms; to interchange 
ideas and to promote good relations between the races but knowing East is East 
and West is West is [sic] [to be] convinced that White cannot assimilate Brown.  
To open America‘s doors to Japanese immigration would, presently at least, be 




The Free Press had the opinion that public opinion simply would not allow any flexibility 
on this issue.
371
  The issue for the Canadian press was not so much about equality, but 
about Canada maintaining control of its immigration policies.  The underlying fact was 
racism, but it was turned into an issue affecting Canada‘s sovereignty.  
Canadian newspapers just did not believe that Japan was ready to be treated as an 
equal.  The News Record wrote that ―Japan is permeated with Imperialism.  It still believes 
in false doctrines that might makes right and that the weak are the natural prey of the 
strong. They breed like rabbits and their own country is overpopulated.‖
372
  The 
newspaper also wrote that ―the Jap may be the equal of any other race, but he is 50 years 
behind the Canadian and American in social and industrial development.‖
373
  The 
newspaper was trying to focus on reasons why the Japanese were not an equal race.  It was 
almost as if they were trying to prove that it was not about the colour of their skin.  The 
newspaper felt that the Japanese were not socially, politically, or culturally ready to be 
treated as an equal. 
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The signing of the Treaty of Versailles was not greeted with joy by Canadian 
newspapers, but rather with relief.  Finally, the war was over. ―War has definitely ended 
with signing of peace,‖ announced The News Record.
374
  The announcements in the 
newspapers after five months of deliberations were almost anti-climactic.  The Free Press 
had no big headline, only announcing at the top of a side column that ―World Peace 
Signed in historic Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.‖
375
  The newspaper wrote that the 
sentiment in the room was one of relief, and that Doherty, Sifton and Foster had signed the 
treaty for Canada.  This was strange, since Foster had already returned to Canada.  True to 
form, The Globe chose to show some religious imagery and quoted Psalm 147 13:14 as its 
headline: ―For He hath strengthened the bars of thy gates . . . He maketh Peace in thy 
borders.‖
376
  While The News Record chose to keep its article on the signing optimistic, 
both the Free Press and The Globe wrote pessimistically. At the top of the article, The 
Globe wrote about how the ―Hun‖ delegates would have never signed if they had known 
how they would be treated, how the Chinese delegates were absent, how the South African 
representative General Jan Smuts registered a protest and how Clemenceau warned the 
Germans about respecting the treaty.
377
  After the long war and Peace Conference it was a 
rather depressing end. 
Despite Wilson‘s leading role in its development, the US never did join the 
League.  Wilson tried his best to ensure that the League passed through Congress, but 
illness brought on by exhaustion and his unwillingness to compromise assured its 
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  The Canadian delegates who ended up signing the treaty on June 28, 1919, were 
Doherty and Sifton.  The representatives for the United Kingdom signed for the British 
Empire, followed by the dominion representatives and India signing for their respective 
countries.
379
  Whether this was equal representation or not, was up for debate.  The Free 
Press merely mentioned that two of Canada‘s cabinet ministers had signed for Canada.
380
  
There was no debate in the newspapers as to whether this meant Canada was equal to 
Great Britain, or any kind of celebratory article suggesting Canada had won something. 
Borden had promised that the treaty would be submitted to Parliament to ensure 
that it was ―more than an empty formality, it must be done before ratification.‖
381
  When 
Borden presented the treaty in the House of Commons on September 1, 1919, he admitted 
it was not perfect, but it was the best that could be expected under the circumstances.
382
  
Questions of Canada‘s status lingered, for the debate focused on whether Parliament even 
had the authority to approve the treaty when it was the job of the King.
383
  Despite all of 
Borden‘s efforts in Paris, there was still debate about Canada‘s status.  It was the same 
fight Borden had been having first in London in the fall and winter of 1918-1919 and then 
in Paris in the winter of 1919.  However, now he was having the fight at home with the 
opposition.  Finally, on September 12, 1919, following a vote in the House of Commons 
the day before, an order-in-council was cabled to London announcing that the treaty had 
been approved by Canada‘s Parliament, and asking the King to ratify the treaty.
384
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The period from the beginning of the Peace Conference to the signing of the 
Treaty of Versailles was marked by increasing pessimism in the Canadian press.  While 
the newspapers still pressed strongly for a League of Nations, for strong Canadian 
representation, for an end to war, for Germany to pay adequate reparations and for an end 
to the old ways of conducting diplomacy, new more complex issues arose.  After the 
excitement from the end of the war, realism began to set in.  Major problems began to 
appear.  The major delegations at the Conference had disagreements, the Italians even 
walked out for a period.  While Wilson still stood strong, US support back home was 
weakening.  Secret treaties from before the war made agreement difficult.  Old diplomacy 
persisted.   
There was trouble at home in Canada as well.  Thousands of soldiers were 
returning home looking for work and many war industries were winding down.  The 
results were events like the Winnipeg General Strike in May of 1919.  The country was 
still recovering from the Spanish Flu.  The conference went on too long for some of 
Canada‘s representatives.  Eventually, Borden had to return to Canada to deal with 
domestic issues.  On the day the treaty was signed, The Globe reported on declining trade 
and the Government of Canada‘s negotiations for a new loan.
385
  Arguably, by the time 
the Peace Conference had ended, as a result of the growing political and economic unrest, 
Canadians were not as interested anymore.  Later historians saw the Peace Conference as a 
noteworthy event, but for most Canadians in June 1919, there were more pressing matters.  
Therefore, there was little debate in the newspapers as to what benefits Canada had gained 
through its representation at the Peace Conference. 
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Despite the depression and pessimism, the main themes stayed much the same.  
Canadian newspapers still had big ideas and were still weak on the explanations of how 
they would be accomplished.  Ending war was still of vital importance.  The press still 
wanted to see international diplomacy conducted in a new way, and was quite upset when 
it did not happen.  While representation at the Peace Conference had been achieved, now 
representation in the League of Nations was demanded.  There were contradictions though 
at times in the newspapers. The Canadian press called for a League of Nations that would 
restrict Canada‘s sovereignty, yet at the same time wanted to increase the country‘s 


































Following the First World War, English-language Canadian newspapers did see 
Canada entering a new era as a result of the Paris Peace Conference.  Canada was 
portrayed as undergoing a religious rebirth and should hold its head high for its strong 
efforts during the war. However, for Canadian newspapers there were some important 
objectives to accomplish.  First and most important, a lasting peace had to be achieved.  
Canadians were tired of war.  The whole world was tired of it.  The Canadian press 
wanted something done to ensure that the peace would be lasting, and some kind of 
mechanism would be put into place to ensure that war never happened again.  Secondly, 
and in conjunction with the first goal, a new way of conducting international diplomacy 
needed to be started.  Secret treaties and the balance of power were no longer adequate, 
and had shown their inadequacy by failing to prevent the war.  The point on open 
covenants of peace from Wilson‘s Fourteen Points was very relevant to the Canadian 
press.  People needed to know what their diplomats and politicians were up to.  The 
newspapers drew upon the tone of the Fourteen Points as a way to conduct international 
diplomacy that would prevent the plots and treaties that had led to the war from happening 
again.   
While Canadian newspapers embraced the optimism of the immediate post-war 
period, they also reflected the many dilemmas and contradictions of how such lofty 
principles could be put into practice.  They failed to provide specific details with how they 
could be accomplished.  The newspapers often failed to understand the complexity and 
contradictions of some of the issues.  The press supported the British Empire, but also 
wished for a new and undetermined form of Canadian representation that would reflect the 
100 
 
country‘s wartime role and independence. Canada did gain a place at the conference table, 
but soon realized that Canada‘s representation could be altered by the whims of the larger 
powers, including Great Britain.  Even as Canada signed the treaty in June, its status 
remained unclear.  The Canadian press wanted to punish the Kaiser and Germany, but was 
uncertain about how best to gain reparations.  Canadians wanted a League of Nations that 
would bring an end to war, but could not come to terms with how the League could 
impinge on its sovereignty.  Canadians wanted to abide by the lofty rhetoric of Wilson‘s 
Fourteen Points, but only when it worked to their advantage.  
How exactly would Canada be able to take control of Greenland? Where would an 
international police force come from?  How could increased sovereignty be advocated for 
Canada within the empire, even as an international league would restrict countries rights, 
yet also oppose any kind of racial equality clause for fear it would restrict Canada‘s right 
to control its immigration?  The quote from Glazebrook used in the first chapter is 
relevant here as well.  Glazebrook wrote that: 
Official Canada had gained experience in the arts of war and diplomacy, and the 
public was to exhibit a marked degree of interest in world affairs – an interest that 
had existed only in a small degree before the war.  Here, if properly encouraged 
and channelled, was one of the most important assets that a country with world 
interests could have. An informed and critical public opinion would in turn 
stimulate parliament to a close study of the government‘s foreign policy, and 
ensure that a degree and direction of Canada‘s activity in the foreign field was in 




Glazebrook wrote about how official Canada and the Canadian public would learn a great 
deal from the Peace Conference.  Canadians would develop a new interest in world affairs 
that would spark Parliament into examining the direction of Canada‘s foreign policy.  
Glazebrook does not mention it, but this idea should apply to the press as well.  The Peace 
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Conference exposed the Canadian press‘ woeful understanding of foreign affairs.  The 
Peace Conference provided an excellent introduction for Canadian newspapers into the 
world of international diplomacy.  New issues which had probably never been considered 
by the press before were now being examined.  While the press often held high-minded 
ideas as to how the Conference would work, and what it would accomplish, the failure of 
the Conference to provide for any kind of lasting peace was an excellent lesson. In order 
for the Canadian public to become informed and critical about world affairs, the Canadian 
press was also going to have to develop these attributes. 
 The understanding of the Peace Conference by Canadians was far more complex 
than most historians have presented.  Throughout the long conference Canadian 
newspapers dealt with many issues and underwent many changes in mood.  From 
optimism to realism and back, Canadian newspapers gave the Peace Conference a large 
amount of coverage.  Not all the coverage dealt with Canada‘s role, but when it was dealt 
with it did not focus entirely on the Peace Conference being a turning point in Canadian 
history.  Yes, it was a very important Conference for Canada, but it was far more 
important that a long lasting and just peace be achieved. 
If Canadians saw the event through the eyes of the Canadian press, they would no 
doubt have been impressed.  Canadian representatives were taking part in one of the 
largest peace Conferences ever.  Initially they may have felt the optimism of the 
newspapers once the war was over.  They may have read with interest about the League of 
Nations that was planned.  They may have debated the dilemmas that the Treaty of Paris 
reflected.  Finally, they may have lost interest by the time the Conference was completed.  
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